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Introduction
The common law1 generally protects a person’s interest in her own 
novel and concrete ideas that, although shared confidentially with some, 
have not yet been published to the world at large. The cases that have 
contributed to the development of this narrow area of law typically follow 
a simple set of facts: a business or scientific idea or an idea for advertising 
slogans, radio or television programs, films, books, or products is shared 
with another in circumstances indicating an expectation of non-use or 
disclosure without permission.2  These ideas may well be the precursors to 
patents,3 trademarks4, trade secrets5 or copyrightable expressions.6
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also thank Robert Chambers, Arthur Cockfield, Michael Pratt, Malcolm Thorburn and Mark 
D. Walters as well as the participants at the 5th Annual Intellectual Property Conference at 
Cardozo Law School for helpful suggestions.  Michelle Roberts provided useful research 
assistance.  I am grateful to the Advisory Research Council, Queen’s University, for funding 
this research.
1 I use “common law” to mean judicially created law (rather than to refer to the 
law developed in courts with “common law” jurisdiction.)  Specifically, I mean state law.
2 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 683, 707 (1980) (discussing “transaction cases” in which protection for ideas is 
sought).
3 See Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1947) (plaintiff’s 
idea later developed and patented); The University of Colorado Foundation Inc. v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 22 Biotech. L. Rep. 665 (Fed Cir. 2003) (plaintiff’s idea was 
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Importantly, however, they do not qualify, for one reason or another, for 
protection within one of these well-established areas of intellectual 
property. 
Some courts and commentators have tentatively asserted that the 
protection of these ideas constitutes a new area of intellectual property law 
called idea-submission law.7  What is lacking however is a unified account 
of why unauthorized use or disclosure of another’s novel and original idea 
is a wrong.  Some courts and academics8 appear to locate the source of the 
obligation not to use or disclose another’s idea in property law,9 while 
foundation for a patent; defendant’s use of plaintiff’s idea in patent application constitutes 
unjust enrichment.)
4 See Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 Fed.Appx. 874 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(Plaintiff’s claim to have a trademark protection in the name “American Idol” rejected on 
the ground that “trademarks only protect fully developed products, not the ideas for the 
products. Also, unregistered trademark rights must be appropriated through use, that is, 
through some commercial activity and Keane asserted no such commercial activity 
sufficient to appropriate such rights.”)  
5A trade secret is “an item of information—commonly a customer list, business 
plan, recipe or manufacturing process—that has commercial value and that the firm 
possessing the information wants to conceal from its competitors in order to prevent their 
duplicating it.” WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 354 (2003).  It need not be novel or original.  Importantly, a 
trade secret is an idea or information that is “used in one's business, and which gives him an 
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” See 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). But idea-submission law protects ideas that may 
not initially be trade secrets because they are not used continuously in the originator’s 
business or perhaps are not business ideas at all. See Ahlert v. Hasbro, Inc., 325 F.Supp 2d 
506, 509, 513 (D.N.J. 2004) (Trade secret claim “re-characterized as a submission-of-idea 
case” because idea not used in business); see also RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW 
DATABASE § 5.5 (trade secret law and idea-submission law not co-extensive).
6 See Werlin v. Reader’s Digest Assoc. Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (RDA 
article about Down Syndrome Bas Mitzvah based on defendant’s idea.)  Although a 
protected idea might develop into an expression or may even be embedded within an 
expression, “an idea’s expression is not entitled to protection under a state’s 
misappropriation law.”  See Duffy v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. 123 F. Supp. 2d 802, 812 
(D.N.J. 2000).
7 See Lionel S. Sobel, Idea-submission Law Revisted, U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV 9, 91 (1994). 
(idea-submission law has produced a set of principles and demands a rigorous analysis not 
unlike that we see in copyright law.)  Cf. Margreth Barrett, The “Law of Ideas” Reconsidered, 
71 J. OF PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 691 (1989) (arguing idea-submission cases currently 
dealt with under unjust enrichment or confidential relationships law could be folded into 
trade secret law with two adjustments: (1) dropping the requirement in trade secret law that 
the idea be used in the plaintiff’s business and (2) dropping the requirement in idea 
submissions law that the idea be novel and concrete).
8 These standard theories for the protection of ideas are also well documented in 
the academic literature.  See BARRETT, supra note 7 at 691.  MELVILLE B. MILLER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, ss. 16.02-16.06 (1993).
9 For example, Belt v. Hamilton Nat’l Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D.D.C. 1952), 
aff’d  by 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206, 
210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1935) (although no property in “abstract idea”, idea that takes on concrete 
form may be property if novel.)
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others look to contract law,10 the law of confidential relationships11 or the 
law of unjust enrichment.12  These traditional theories, as I argue below, do 
not, singly or together, satisfactorily account for the protection of ideas at 
law.  In sum, although there is judicial consensus that there is a protected 
interest in unpublished, novel ideas shared in confidence, its theoretical 
foundations remain undeveloped. 
This paper takes up two challenges: the first is to account for the 
source of the duty not to use or disclose another’s idea in a manner that 
reveals rather than obscures the contours of the positive law and the 
interests and values the law serves.  I present an account of the law in 
which I characterize the juridical source of this duty as a limited, in 
personam13 legal power to control use or disclosure of one’s novel and 
original idea.  This powers-based account, I argue, unifies the case law, 
makes sense of the core criteria in the positive law and also explains certain 
features that limit the scope of idea-submission law –why for instance there 
is no duty created where an idea reaches a recipient inadvertently or 
without the originator’s knowledge.  Building on theoretical work by 
Joseph Raz and others on the formal nature of powers, my account also 
illuminates the kind of values and interests that underpin idea-submission 
law. Identifying a legal power as the source of the duty not to use or 
disclose another’s novel and original ideas permits us to draw connections 
not just with other areas of the law aimed at protecting ideas and 
confidences but also to place the originator’s power within a category of 
general powers that we all have as legal subjects, alongside of the power to 
contract, the power to acquire property, and the power to consent to sexual 
relations.  These general, stand-alone powers serve in different ways our 
fundamental interest in pursuing our private ends while engaging 
selectively with others.  
10 See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 
1986).
11 See Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 469 (1957) (denying 
motion to dismiss claim that defendant used idea for beer ad in breach of confidence.)
12 See e.g. Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(employee entitled to value of services for disclosing “inventive ideas” for cargo unloading 
to agent of employer on unjust enrichment theory.)  See also Harold C. Havigurst, The Right 
to Compensation for an Idea, 49 NW. U. L. REV. 295, 301 (1954) (unjust enrichment theory best 
explains protection of ideas). 
13 Powers and their correlate, liabilities, as well rights and their correlate, duties 
can be either in rem or in personam.  See JAMES PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 30 
(1997) (in rem norms, including powers, set up impersonal practices, and in personam norms, 
personal practices.)  Powers that are in personam affect the legal status of specific persons, 
where their “individuality is relevant to the right.”  Id. at 29.  See Section IV, infra, on the 
minimum foundation of voluntariness needed before a person becomes liable to the 
originator’s power to control disclosure.
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The second challenge that I confront in fashioning an account of the 
duty not to use or disclose another’s idea is to reconcile this duty with the 
limited concept of responsibility that has developed in Anglo-American 
law.  I argue that the creation of a non-general, personal duty through a 
legal power is consistent with the concept of responsibility that has 
emerged in the law only where the obligation rests on a foundation of 
voluntariness.  The importance of voluntariness in the Anglo-American 
law of obligations is evident in the reception courts and commentators 
have given to a duty to rescue.14  While the interests of a person in need 
may indeed be sufficiently important to warrant legal protection, the law 
has shied away from imposing a duty to rescue where there is no basis 
grounded in voluntariness on which to select a specific individual to bear 
the burden.15  A foundation of voluntariness sufficient to support the 
imposition of a special duty exists where at minimum the position from 
which the duty flows is voluntarily assumed, even if the duty itself is not.  
Thus, while the duty not to use or disclose an idea need not itself be 
voluntarily assumed (as it would have to be on a contractual account), a 
person must have voluntarily assumed the position of recipient of an idea 
before she will be liable (in the Hohfeldian16 sense) to the originator’s 
power to control the extent to which she shares her pre-published idea.  
In this paper, I remain agnostic on some important debates on the 
broader economic and social implications of ideas-protection: Does a 
power-conferring norm in favor of originators of ideas provide the right 
incentives for further production of ideas?  Does it foster a creative society 
in which thinkers and researchers are honored?17  However, by clarifying 
the juridical source of a duty not to use or disclose another's idea, and the 
limits on the recipient’s liability, I hope also to have set the foundation for 
these and other inquiries.18
 In the first part of this article, I argue that there is a doctrinal core 
to idea-submission law and I explain recent movement away from this core 
in terms of a struggle by courts to force a fit between idea-submission law 
and conventional theories of ideas protection.
In the second part, I analyze and reject the conventional accounts of 
the basis for the protection of such ideas at law with particular attention to 
property and unjust-enrichment theories.  I argue that critical features of 
14 See Section IV(B) infra.
15 Id.
16 See W. N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING 72 (1919) (setting out basic legal relations, in which a right correlates to a duty, a 
power, to a liability, a privilege to a no-right).
17 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property in STEPHEN R. MUENZER (ED.), NEW 
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (2001).   
18 I also leave for another day a detailed discussion of the vulnerability of idea-
submission law to claims of preemption.  For treatment of preemption issues, see Barrett, 
supra note 7 at 717-36; Brian Devine, Free as the Air: Re-thinking the Law of Short Ideas,” 24 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 355, 375-380 (2001-2002).
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these general areas of law are overlooked or their proper scope distorted 
where they are deployed in the context of the protection of pre-published 
ideas.
 In the third part, I advance a powers-based account of the juridical 
source of this duty and consider the implications of the concept of a legal 
power for our understanding of idea-submission law.
In the fourth part, I ask and respond to a question that is central to 
any account of obligation: on what basis does the law select a particular 
individual to bear a special duty?
In the fifth part, I explain how the powers thesis accommodates the 
core requirements in the positive law.  The last part concludes.  
I. Features of Protected Ideas
The common thread in idea-submission law has not traditionally 
been the particular legal theory on which a case is brought — contract, 
property, unjust enrichment, or confidential relationships19— but rather 
certain core criteria concerning the nature of the idea.20  Even without an 
explicit unifying theory for idea-submission law, idea-submission cases 
across jurisdictions have typically turned on the novelty, originality, 
confidentiality and concreteness of the idea.  While courts use the language 
of one or another legal theory, they did not traditionally force a fit between 
the general legal theories and idea-submission law.21  Courts increasingly 
19 See Section II for a discussion of these conventional theories.
20 See note 23, infra.  See also Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 107 N.J. 
Super 311 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1969) (noting that “a plaintiff is required to 
establish as a prerequisite to relief that (1) the idea was novel, (2) it was 
made in confidence [sic], (3) it was adopted and made use of. “); Murray v. 
National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988) (focusing on 
characteristics of idea, stating: “The dispositive issue is whether plaintiff’s 
idea is entitled to legal protection.”); Barrett, supra note 7 at 710 (courts 
routinely apply core requirements, like novelty and concreteness, to claims 
for ideas under quasi-contract, confidential relationship and implied-in-
fact contract as well as property theory); Uniform Computer Info. 
Transactions Act, Part 2(D) § 215 (“An agreement to disclose an idea 
creates a contract enforceable against the receiving party only if the idea as 
disclosed is confidential, concrete, and novel to the business, trade, or industry 
or the party receiving the disclosure otherwise expressly agreed.”) (my 
emphasis).
21 See e.g. Barrett, supra note 7 at 699-704 (noting language of 
misappropriation does not correlate to a real application of a property 
theory) and at 737 (noting that “in their nervousness about recognizing 
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treat these elements collectively as a baseline, from which they may and do 
depart, as they are led by the logic of one or another of the conventional 
theories of idea-protection.  The drift away from this core is best 
understood as an effort to render idea-submission law consistent with the 
more general tenets of conventional legal theories.22  This motivation is 
misguided.  A legal theory should accommodate (rather than dictate) the 
shape of the law. 
I start here by setting out these core criteria in more detail and by 
tracking the disruptions of this core in the case law.
Novelty and originality
Traditionally, an idea to be protected had to show both “genuine 
novelty and invention.”23  Courts across jurisdictions have not been 
entirely clear on how to assess novelty and originality nor on how these 
criteria are different.24
 Originality properly refers to the source of the idea: an idea is 
original if the plaintiff independently conceived of it.25  Few courts have 
individual rights in contract some jurisdictions have imposed special 
requirements upon idea contracts both express and implied that would not 
otherwise be imposed under common law contract principles”). 
22 The effort to make idea-submission law responsive to the logic of the particular 
theory that is applied is often explicit.  See notes 22, 36, 39, infra; see also Mary LaFrance, 
Something Borrowed, Something New, The Changing Role of Novelty in Idea-Protection Law, 34 
SETON HALL L. REV. 485 (2004) (arguing that the rationale for requiring novelty in the 
context of a unjust enrichment claim not necessarily persuasive in the context of a contract 
claim).
23 Murray, 844 F.2d at 992.  See also Downey v. General Foods, 31 N.Y. 2d 256, 259 
(1972) (no promise to pay and no property without novelty and originality); Khreativity 
Unlimited. v. Mattel Inc., 101 F.Supp. 2d 177, aff’d  by 242 F. 3d 366 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 822 (2001) (general novelty essential for unjust enrichment); Waner v. Ford 
Motor Co., 331 F.3d 851, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2003); De Filippis v. Chrysler Corp., 53 F.Supp. 977 
(D.C.N.Y.1944), aff'd by159 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 848 (1947).
24 While some courts take care to observe the distinct meanings of novelty and 
originality (see AEB & Associates Design Group, Inc. v. Tonka Corporation, 853 F. Supp. 
724, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (the court refers to novelty and originality as “two elements,” an 
acknowledgement that that they are in fact distinct requirements)), other courts use the 
words “original” and “novel” interchangeably or in the alternative, without explanation.  
See Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F. 3d 368, 374 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(contrasting novelty to the defendant with “originality or novelty generally”); Murray, 844 
F.2d at 993 (treating originality and novelty as synonyms).   
25 Originality means “conceived by the plaintiff.”  See Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 195 
N.Y.S. 574, 575 (1922); See Murray, 844 F 2d. at 992 (noting that protection requires “genuine 
novelty and invention” and that “in assessing whether an idea is in the public domain, the 
central issue is the uniqueness of the creation.” (my emphasis); Educational Sales Programs, 
Inc. v. Dreyfus Corp, 317 N.Y.S.2d 840, 844 (1970) (idea must show “genuine novelty and 
invention” in order to be considered original or novel); Duffy, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 810 (“idea 
must demonstrate innovation originality or invention”).  See Stanley, 35 Cal. 2d at 675 
(Traynor J. dissenting) (“the idea must be embodied in a concrete form attributable to 
plaintiff’s own ingenuity.”); Smith v. Recrion Corp., 91 Nev. 666 (1975) (“The purpose of the 
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elaborated further on the definition and importance of originality26—
perhaps because they share Nimmer’s view that an objectively novel idea 
by definition originates from the plaintiff.27  The originator of an idea must 
establish not just that she generated the idea independently but also that 
the idea is new to the world.28  While objective or general novelty in this 
sense has proved difficult to assess,29 it was traditionally required under all 
legal theories for protection of ideas across most jurisdictions30 and 
test [of concreteness] is to insure that the idea merits protection: That it is ‘tangible’ and 
would not exist but for the independent efforts of the author.”)  Melville B. Nimmer, Idea-
submission Law, 27 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 144 (1954) (originality means 
“independent and creative in thought…not copied, imitated, or reproduced” but in context 
of law of ideas, “plaintiff must establish not merely that he did not copy another’s work but 
that no other such work ever existed).
26 For instance, courts applying a property-based approach have considered fully 
the implications of requiring originality.  If one only protects the originator against use or 
disclosure, then there is a restriction on full alienability of this resource:  if the originator 
gives the idea to another who then wants share it in a limited way with a third person, that 
intermediate recipient should be able to, but cannot given the originality requirement, 
assume the exact same legal position as the first “owner” with respect to the idea.  See
PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY, supra note 12 at 112 (“there is nothing special about my 
ownership of a particular car –the relationship the next owner will have to it is essentially 
identical.”)
27 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8 at s. 16.08.  Indeed, I have not read a case in 
which the plaintiff is not taken to be the source of the idea.  Nimmer’s reasoning however is 
not entirely satisfactory: it ignores the point I make below that a recipient of an idea might 
possess an idea not in the public domain (i.e. that is novel) not because she came up with it 
herself, but rather because it has been shared privately only with her.  Although novel, the 
idea has not originated with them.  
28 Nimmer, Idea-submission Law, supra note 25 at 144. 
29 Novelty means something less than non-obviousness in a patent context.  See 
Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Communications, Inc. 118 F.3d 955, 969 (2d Cir. 
1997), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1020 (1998) (“the term ‘novelty’ is used in this line of cases in a 
very different and much weaker sense than it is used in patent law.”); Johnson v. Benjamin 
Moore & Co., 347 N.J. Super. 71, 89 (N.J. Sup. A.D. 2002), remanded, 796 A.2d 893 ( N.J. 
2002) (explaining Softel).  Factors for assessing novelty in the context of idea-submission law 
include commonality (how many people know the idea?); specificity or generality 
(specificity cuts in favor of novelty); commercial availability; obviousness (is the idea an 
obvious adaptation from an idea in the public domain?); and secrecy (did an otherwise 
novel idea loses its novelty by disclosure to the world?). See Nadel, 208 F. 3d at 378; Duffy, 
123 F. Supp. 2d at 810.  See also Oasis Music, Inc. v. 900 U.S.A., Inc., 614 N.Y.S. 2d 878 (1994) 
(“an improvement and mixture of know or preexisting ideas already in the public domain” 
not novel.)
30 See e.g. Noble v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 270 F.2d 938, 939 (D.C. Cir. 
1959) (“fatal difficulty” with plaintiff’s case “as a matter of law” is that it “lacks the essential 
element of novelty.”); Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F.2d 345 (8th Cir 1934) 
(plaintiff has no right to compensation because idea for improving the defendant’s product; 
it was not novel because many other car drivers knew of it.)
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continues to be required in most,31 with the exception of California and, 
recently, New York.
In California, general novelty ceased to be a requirement for the 
protection of ideas quite early on.32  After the 1947 amendments to the 
California Civil Code § 980, 33 which eliminated a property-based theory 
for the protection of ideas,34 courts in California set out to reconcile idea-
submission law with contract law.  Because they could not simply stipulate 
a requirement of novelty for the formation of a contract,35 courts quickly 
did away with novelty as a pre-requisite to protection.36  Novelty in the 
context of a contract took on an evidentiary function: evidence of valuable 
consideration rather than a necessary element of a claim.37  On this 
reasoning, accepted in California, novelty to the buyer certainly would 
provide evidence of the value of the disclosure to the recipient; however, 
valuable consideration might exist even in the absence of novelty, simply 
in the act of bringing an idea to someone’s attention.38
31 See Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 628 (3d Cir. 2004)  (Courts in N.J. have 
established when an idea is “not novel” because it was “in the domain of public 
knowledge”).  Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1222 (10th Cir.  2004) (“It is not 
entirely clear under Colorado law whether an idea must be novel to be actionable….  
[B]ecause most other states appear to require an idea to be novel before its misappropriation 
can be actionable….  It is reasonable to conclude the Colorado Supreme Court would 
likewise adopt such a requirement. To hold otherwise would seem nonsensical, because it 
would allow plaintiffs to sue and prevail on the basis of existing and commonly known 
ideas.”).  See also Official Airlines Schedule Info. Serv., Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, 333 F.2d 
672, 676 (5th Cir. 1964).  For the traditional approach in New York and California, see 
Murray, 844 F.2d at 992 (a 1988 case noting that objective or general novelty required under 
all theories in NY); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 35 Cal. 2d 653, 665 (1950) 
(pre-Desny case noting that an idea must be novel, reduced to concrete form and disclosed 
under circumstances indicating expectation of compensation).
32 The turning point was in Desny, 46 Cal. 2d at 729 (novelty not required where an 
express contract provides for payment for use); Chandler v. Roach, 156 Cal. App. 2d 435, 
443 (1957) (no novelty for implied-in-fact contract.)
33 Cal. Civ. Code. Div. 2, Title 3, Part 2, ch. 3 § 980.
34 See Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 788 (1953) (“The 1947 amendment to 
section 980 has eliminated the protection formerly given to 'any product of the mind.’ ”)
35 Other basic requirements for the formation of a contract include legal capacity as 
well as a lawful subject matter.  Restatement (Contracts) § 17 (requirement of mutual 
assent); § 22 (mutual assent manifest through offer and acceptance); § 71(requirement of 
consideration); §1 and comment g (requirement of capacity).
36 See e.g. Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 445 (novelty not required to establish 
implied-in-fact contract because these are not required for other types of implied-in-fact 
contracts.)
37 See LaFrance, supra note 22 passim (analyzing evidentiary role of novelty in the 
case law).
38 Desny, 46 Cal. 2d at 729 (“even though an idea disclosed may be widely known 
and generally understood, it may be protected by an express contract providing that it will 
be paid for regardless of its lack of novelty”); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 245 
Cal. App.2d 593, 612-13 (1966) (express and implied contract to pay for idea for a television 
format binds defendant even with respect to non-novel portions).
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In a similar vein, courts in New York have been moved by the 
principles of contract law39 to do away with the requirement of novelty for 
contracts formed after disclosure,40 and have lowered the standard for pre-
disclosure contracts from objective to subjective novelty or novelty to the 
buyer.41 The shift away from the traditional core prerequisite of novelty, as 
in California is unequivocally driven by the demands of consistency with 
the general legal theory offered for the protection of ideas: “[t]he law of 
contracts would have to be substantially rewritten were we to allow buyers 
of fully disclosed ideas to disregard their obligation to pay simply because 
an idea could have been obtained from some other source or in some other 
way.”42
The logic of other conventional legal theories has exerted a similar 
pressure on courts to modify the novelty requirement.  For unjust 
enrichment claims in New York and California, a plaintiff need only 
establish that the idea was novel to the defendant, rather than generally or 
objectively novel.  The reasoning is plain enough: the disclosure of an idea 
that is new to the defendant might just as well constitute a valuable service, 
and hence enrichment, as the disclosure of an objectively novel idea.43  An 
unjust enrichment account simply does not make sense of the requirement 
39 See Nadel, 208 F.3d at 377 (“We note… that the "novelty to the buyer" standard 
comports with traditional principles of contract law.”)
40 See Apfel, 81 N.Y. 2d at 473, 476 (no novelty at all required for post-disclosure 
contracts).
41  See Nadel, 208 F.3d at 378 (picking up on dicta in Apfel, noting that novelty to the 
buyer establishes sufficient consideration in the context of pre-disclosure.)
42 Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., 81 N.Y. 2d 470, 478 (1993); see also note 
40 (citing concern with traditional principles of contract law).
43 See Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 528 F.Supp. 451 (D.C.N.Y. 1981) 
(acknowledging that an unjust enrichment depends on a showing of novelty but reasoning: 
“While it might be argued [novelty] is not proven here because Werlin's idea had already 
been disclosed by publication of her article in Houston's Legal Advocate, RDA has not 
seriously suggested that it might have come across Werlin's article had she not mailed it in); 
see also Trenton Industries v. A. E. Peterson Manufacturing Co, 165 F. Supp. 523, 532 (S.D. 
Cal. 1958) in which the plaintiff sent the defendant a sample chair of an unusual design.  
The defendant kept this specimen for two months, photographed it, and, finally, returned it 
with the message that he was not interested.  Later, the defendant noticed that the exact 
same design was used for the chairs in his church.  He simply had not noticed it before.  
Concluding that this meant the design was in the public domain, he began to manufacture 
chairs using it.  The plaintiff sued and the court held that, although the design was indeed 
in the public domain, it was not novel in an objective sense but it was new to the defendant.  
However, the court decided that novelty to the defendant was enough to establish that the 
defendant had been unjustly enriched because the idea was novel to him: “he had seen 
these church chairs on numerous prior occasions, but did not take any particular notice of 
them and did not derive the thought that it was possible to use a similar mechanism in 
manufacturing a high chair until he received and scrutinized the plaintiff’s disclosure.
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of genuine novelty and courts have responded by lowering the standard of 
novelty.44
As much as the courts in California and New York have pushed the 
logic of contract formation to the conclusion that no novelty45 or only 
subjective novelty46 is required and the logic of unjust enrichment to the 
conclusion that subjective novelty will suffice, the traditional shape of idea-
submission law still holds in other idea-submission cases in these 
jurisdictions.  For instance, California and New York courts continue to 
insist on novelty in other theories, such as breach of confidential 
relationship47 — notwithstanding that novelty had no clear role in either 
the formation of a true confidential relationship or in the scope of the 
fiduciary-like obligations that ordinarily flow. 
The requirement of novelty tells us something about the duration of 
the protection the law offers originators of ideas.  When the idea ceases to 
be novel—when it enters the public domain –the originator can no longer 
insist that others have a duty not to use or disclose the idea.48  The 
protection comes to a natural end where the plaintiff voluntarily releases 
the idea to the public49 or where an independent originator does so50 and 
44 See Section  II(A) below on the strain in the other direction, on the law of unjust 
enrichment by idea-submission law due to Arrow’s paradox.
45 See notes 32, 36, 39, supra and accompanying text (novelty in California).
46 See notes 40, 41, 43 supra and accompanying text (novelty in New York).
47 Entertainment Research Group v. Genesis, 122 F.3d 1211, 1227 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(ideas must be novel and original to be protected under breach of confidence); Downey v. 
General Foods, 31 N.Y. 2d 56 (1972) (novelty required for protection where basis is 
confidential relationship).
48 Havigurst, supra note 12 at 302 (public disclosure makes an idea free to all.)
49 See J. Irizarry y Puente v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 248 F.2d 799 
(1st Cir.1957) (plaintiff “had already disclosed his idea to ‘1500 important business and 
banking institutions and leading law firms throughout the country’” and thus had no 
further claim against defendant even if idea had been novel and original.)  See also Waner, 
331 F.3d at 923. (By exhibiting fender lines publicly at a horse fair before sharing them with 
the defendant, originator had released the idea into the public domain; thus, defendant was 
free to use or disclose the idea (before patent issued)).  See also Kovacs v. Mutual 
Broadcasting System, 99 Cal. App (2d) 56, 58-59 (the plaintiff had already shared the idea in 
confidence with a few radio stations, and was about to approach others, one by one, when 
the defendant broadcast his radio format, at which point he gave up negotiations.) 
50 See Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 132 N.Y. 264, 267 (1892) 
(No protection because idea for soliciting insurance business already in use in the industry: 
“Its use seems to be its disclosure”); See AEB & Associate Design Group Inc. v. Tonka Corp., 
853 F.Supp. 724, 733-35 (no protection where another has independently created idea, even 
if idea is novel and original).   Independent creation is a popular defense, although it raises 
evidentiary problems.  See Sobel, supra note 7 at 65-76.  In Hoeltke, 80 F.2d 912, the 
defendants claimed to have come up with the same idea independently of the plaintiff.  The 
court was understandably skeptical.  In Downey, 334 N.Y.S. 2d at 875, the defendant argued 
both (1) that the idea was in the public domain and (2) that its people had “independently 
created and developed” the concept of using the name “Mr. Wiggle” to make Jell-O more 
appealing to kids.  They won on the first defense rather than the second.
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an unnatural end where another releases the idea without the originator’s 
consent.51
Confidentiality
The third core prerequisite for idea-protection is the confidential 
nature of the disclosure.  Traditionally, a recipient is not bound by a duty 
not to use or disclose the idea unless the originator indicates that disclosure 
is limited and private, rather than unlimited and public.52  However, it is 
not enough for the originator of an idea simply to claim that a disclosure is 
private and limited if in fact it is not.  A prior publication of the idea would 
naturally defeat a claim that you are telling someone something that is 
secret53 as would a disclosure that is in fact a publication rather than a 
private communication.54  A confidential submission is one that accurately 
indicates to the recipient that the idea is not already publicly available55
and is not through this disclosure being made public.
51 In this idea-submission law bears some resemblance to common law copyright 
that protects pre-published expressions.  See Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899) (“If an 
author permits his intellectual production to be published…, his right to a copyright is lost 
as effectually as the right of an inventor to a patent which he deliberately abandons to the 
public—and this too irrespective if his actual intention not to make such an abandonment.”) 
Common law copyright and the common law power over ideas share an important feature: 
protection ceases whether or not the decision to publish is made by the person vested with 
the authority to do so, if as a matter of fact the expression or the idea is released to the 
public.
52 Courts’ concern for private nature of submission, indicated by its purpose,  
reflects implicit criterion of  confidentiality.  See e.g. Stanley, 35 Cal. 2d at 653 (idea for radio 
program submitted to defendant “ for the purpose of having the defendant determine 
whether or not it desired to purchase it or license the right to use it under an implied 
agreement that if the defendant did use the radio program it would pay plaintiff its 
reasonable value.”).  The meaning of confidentiality emerges more explicitly in Thompson, 
150 Cal. App. 2d at 476 (“The letter by which he transmitted this idea to the defendants …  
does not of itself indicate any element of confidence in their relationship. Upon the other 
hand, nothing said in this letter necessarily negatives there having been an understanding 
between the parties of such a nature that when thus transmitted this new and novel idea 
was submitted to them ‘in confidence’ and accepted by them in confidence and upon the 
understanding that they would not use the idea without the consent of plaintiff.")
53 Not only must the originator indicate the confidentiality of the idea in the 
circumstances, the representation must be correct.  See Entertainment Research Group, 122 
F.3d at 1227 (notwithstanding express statement by plaintiff at time of disclosure that ideas 
for doll design, manufacturing and marketing were confidential court found:  “plaintiff 
could not have conveyed any ‘confidential’ information to the defendant concerning her 
products for the express reason that three of the dolls in question--the products at issue--
were already on the market.”)
54 See Waner, 331 F.3d at 856 (non-confidential disclosure defeats claim of unjust 
enrichment)
55 “In confidence” means sharing non-publicly. See Keane v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 931, aff’d by 129 Fed.Appx. 874 (5th Cir. 2005) (claim that 
idea submitted “in confidence belied by allegation that ‘secret’ was mass-mailed.”) 
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 “Confidentiality” in this sense is a core criterion, if only implicitly, 
across legal theories. Courts tend to reserve explicit language of 
confidentiality for cases brought under the rubric of breach of confidence 
or confidential relationship. Courts have not, however, tried to move this 
criterion into line with the law of confidential relationships more 
generally.56  Even in the context of cases framed as actions for breach of 
confidential relationships, courts only require confidentiality in this special 
sense rather than in the more limited sense of reposing trust from the law 
of confidential relationships.57
While courts traditionally required confidentiality in cases brought 
as actions for unjust enrichment,58 they have followed the general logic of 
unjust enrichment in doing away with this requirement in cases framed in 
this theory.  Whether or not the plaintiff shares the idea with the defendant 
in circumstances indicating the private or non-public nature of the 
disclosure simply does not bear on whether the plaintiff provided the 
defendant with a non-gratuitous benefit through his services for which he 
expected to be paid.59  A person may be unjustly enriched where an idea is 
disclosed in circumstances that are not confidential, a point that courts 
have come to recognize in adjusting idea-submission law to fit the law of 
unjust enrichment theory.60  Confidentiality might of course play a lesser, 
evidentiary role in establishing liability for use or disclosure on an unjust 
enrichment account: it might be a factor in establishing that the plaintiff 
was interacting with the defendant in particular with the expectation of 
getting paid.  Such a move from an element of an action to a merely 
evidentiary device would be a significant change in emphasis from the 
traditional approach in idea-submission jurisprudence. 
56 See Thompson, 150 Cal. App. 2d at 476.
57 See Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App.3d 309, 323 (1979) (“There must exist evidence of 
the communication of the confidentiality of the submission.”) For more on the way in which 
the law of confidential relationships, among other conventional theories, is stretched to 
make sense of the core criterion, see section II(B), infra.
58 See e.g. De Filippis v. Chrysler Corp, 53 Fed. Supp. 977, 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (to 
recover in unjust enrichment for use of one’s novel and original idea, plaintiff must 
establish that he had shared his idea in confidence”).
59 Trenton, 165 F. Supp. at 532 (“It is immaterial whether the communication is 
expressly made in confidence, so long as it is made on an understanding either tacit or 
express that the person communicating the idea, or the owner of the idea, expected to be 
compensated if it was to be used by the person receiving it.”)
60 See Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F.Supp. 1204, 1216 (D.C.N.Y. 
1981) (“To sustain recovery in quasi-contractual restitution it is unnecessary that the 
disclosure have been made in confidence, or that the parties be in a confidential 
relationship.”)  See also Trenton, 165 F. Supp. at 532.  In fact, Nimmer, who found a quasi-
contract account compelling could not square the importance of confidentiality in the case 
law with the law of unjust enrichment.  He noted that “enrichment might well be unjust in 
circumstances where disclosure was not confidential and therefore the element of a 
confidential relationship should not be a sine qua non to recovery.” Nimmer, Idea-submission 
Law, supra note 25 at 125-26.
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Concreteness
Courts very early on in the development of idea-submission law 
insisted that only concrete ideas qualify for common-law protection.61
While the case law offers little clarity on the meaning of “concreteness,”62
the dominant view is that an idea is concrete only if it is far enough along 
in its development that it is “ripe for implementation.”63   An approach 
with less traction in the case law takes not the stage of development but 
rather the tangibility of the idea as a measure of concreteness: an idea is 
concrete on this view only if it takes tangible form.64  This second approach 
emerged in cases applying a proprietary theory for the protection of ideas: 
courts refused to protect merely “abstract” ideas because these are “so 
unattached as to be deemed legally without the quality of individual 
identity or property.”65  While concreteness has traditionally had a role 
across legal theories,66 some courts have started to drift from this baseline 
on the now-familiar ground that the criterion does not fit the legal theory 
on offer.67
The trend toward greater consistency with traditional legal theories 
generally leads to greater inconsistency in the requirements for the 
protection of ideas across legal theories.  This has led at least one court to 
call California law a “deviation from the ‘traditional view’”68 and an 
61 Hamilton Nat’l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (an idea may be property only 
if it is “more than a mere abstraction; it must be reduced to a concrete detailed form”); see
Flemming, 107 N.J. Super at 316-317 (an idea must be “concrete and usable”, not abstract.)  In 
Flemming, the fact that the idea could be transformed into a product meant that it was 
concrete and usable.  See also Matarese, 158 F.2d at 634 (usable means marketable).
62 See Sobel, supra note 7 at 53 (concrete used in a variety of ways); Barrett, supra
note 7 at 712-13 (noting that there are two general approaches, the first requiring that the 
idea be reduced to a tangible form, the second requiring that ideas be developed enough to 
be ready for use, citing Smith, 91 Nev at 670).
63 See Smith, 91 Nev. at 670 (concrete means ready for immediate use and 
suggesting that concreteness establishes that “the idea is ‘tangible’ and would not exist but 
for the independent efforts of the plaintiff.”); Tate v. Scanlan Intern., Inc., 403 N.W.2d 666 
(Minn.App. 1987) (“If an idea requires extensive investigation, research, and planning 
before it is ripe for implementation, it is not concrete”); Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 439 (an 
idea is concrete where there is “[s]ufficient development of the idea to give it identifying 
characteristics).
64 See Barrett, supra note 7 at 712 (citing to cases taking this approach).
65 Belt, 210 F.2d at 708 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
66 See Stanley, 35 Cal. 2d at 671 (no implied-in-fact contract unless idea is concrete); 
Sobel, supra note 7 at 56 (no recovery under confidential relationship theory unless concrete, 
citing McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F.Supp. 277, 285 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) and Fink v. Goodson-
Todman Enterprises, Ltd., 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1009 (1970).
67 Chandler, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 443 (concreteness not required for contract-based 
protection).   
68 Benjamin Moore, 347 N.J. Super. 71 at 87.
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“aberration … in comparison with other aspects of the law of California,”69
in that core criteria abandoned under some legal theories in California (like 
novelty) are still required for the protection of ideas under some theories in 
that same state.70  The emerging contours of idea-submission law—through 
the modification of core criteria— appear to reflect more a commitment to 
the general value of fit than it does a finer-grained appreciation of the 
particular values and interests that idea-submission law serves.71
 Consistency and intelligibility do matter.72  Conventional legal 
theories have failed to make sense of certain core criteria.  This has created 
one problem of fit that judges have gradually tried to resolve by modifying 
the baseline for protection.  This approach is unsatisfactory in that the kind 
of protection that the law offers the originators of ideas should not be 
shaped by the choice of legal theory; rather, our choice of legal theories 
should reflect the shape of the law.  But there is another problem of fit 
between idea-submission law and conventional legal theories that is even 
more intractable: these theories cannot account for idea-submission law 
unless we ignore critical aspects of the nature and structure of these areas 
of law or extend their reach to factual circumstances in which they 
ordinarily would not apply. 
 II. The Conventional Accounts of the Source of the Duty
 Commentators and courts generally acknowledge four potential 
accounts of the liability of a recipient of an original and novel idea for its 
use or disclosure without the originator’s permission: accounts based on 
property, unjust enrichment, contract, and confidential relationship.73  The 
first two accounts (property theory and unjust enrichment) are, I will argue 
here, untenable without distorting or weakening basic principles and 
doctrines in the law of property and the law of unjust enrichment.  The 
other two accounts (contract and confidential relationship) are potential 
sources for a duty not to disclose or misuse another’s idea, but fail to cover 
all circumstances in which courts find recipients of an idea to be under a 
duty of non-disclosure or use or to account for the features that courts have 
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 As discussed above, note 20 et seq. and accompanying text, the courts have
largely been driven by a desire to fit the protection of ideas squarely within existing 
conventional accounts of the source of the duty not to use or disclose.
72 This really is nothing more than a common-sense recognition that intelligibility 
and consistency are valuable.  See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 264 (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1994) (noting the “undoubted value of coherence as intelligibility.”)
73 See John Kettle, What Every Litigator Must Know About Intellectual Property, 
available at < http://www.pli.edu/emktg/toolbox/ip_protect.pdf > (Ideas are protected at 
state law under four theories: express contract, implied contract theory, unjust 
enrichment/quasi-contract; and conversion).
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taken to be fundamental to the protection of ideas submitted in confidence 
to another.
A. Untenable Theories: Property and Unjust Enrichment
The first two accounts conventionally offered to explain idea-
submission law are untenable on their own terms.  The first rests on the 
idea that there is property in ideas, and that unauthorized use or disclosure 
of an idea is the misappropriation of property.74  A proprietary account of 
idea-submission law makes use of the rhetoric of property law without 
really undertaking to treat ideas as property.  Thus, it is not surprising that 
the duty that actually emerges in idea-submission law—an in personam
duty held by a few specific individuals not to disclose or use the idea—
does not comport with the structure of the duty that correlates to a 
property right, viz., a standing duty held by the world at large.  A theory 
based on implied-in-law contract treats a recipient of a novel and original 
idea shared in confidence as unjustly enriched if she uses the idea without 
permission.75  This position may capture the intuition that the defendant 
who uses or discloses someone else’s idea has gotten something for free 
where he ought to have paid for it.  However, there is a fundamental 
problem of fit between the law of unjust enrichment and idea-submission 
law caused by Arrow’s paradox. 
Proprietary Account
An intuitive explanation for the protection of ideas in law is that the 
originator of an idea is the owner of the idea—the idea is her property.  This 
is in fact the response that a number of courts have given76 although some 
74 See e.g. Kovacs, 99 Cal. App (2d) at 62-63 (pre-Desny case treating ideas for radio 
program as protectible “products of the mind” on a property theory); Belt, F. Supp. at 691 
(claim for wrongful appropriate of an idea for a radio program succeeded, court finding 
“the law now gives effect to a property right in an idea even though the idea may be neither 
patentable nor subject to copyright.”)
75 See e.g. Trenton, 165 F.Supp. 523.  
76 Baer, 392 F.3d at 628 (explaining predicates of a “property right in an idea”); 
Downey v. General Foods Corp., 334 N.Y.S. 2d. 874, 877 (1972) (“An idea may be a property 
right” where it is novel and original); Reeves v. Aleyska Pipeline Serv. Co., 926 P. 2d 1130 
(1996) (Protection under a property theory requires that ideas possess “property-like” 
traits); Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 84 F.Supp.2d 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that state law claim for the misappropriation of a novel 
and original idea is not preempted); Nadel, 208 F.3d at 378 (proprietary nature of right in 
ideas explains the novelty requirement); Garrido v. Burger King Corp., 558 So.2d 79, 84 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (idea that is novel is property); Irizarry v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard Col., 248 F.2d 799 (1 Cir. 1957) (no property in ideas that are not original and 
novel).
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courts–notably in California–have clearly rejected this approach.77  The 
appeal of the proprietary approach is intuitive: for example, we tend to use 
possessive pronouns to describe ideas—this special way of tying a rope is 
my idea, that concept for a television series is his idea.  We also recognize 
that for some period after its conception, at least before the generator shares 
it with anyone, an idea is within the generator’s control.  Our natural 
control over our own thoughts—the fact that no one else can force us to 
divulge them or change them—might suggest that ideas should in all 
circumstances continue to be treated in law as within the sphere of control 
of their originators.78  We might be tempted then to think that ideas are 
property, as property is the institution by which the law treats a thing as 
permanently within the sphere of influence and control of a particular 
individual.   Finally, especially where an idea is potentially patentable, 
courts are perhaps tempted by the proprietary nature of statutorily created 
patents to find that at common law, too, ideas are property.79
The case against a property theory of protection for ideas has often 
been put too strongly: ideas, it has been argued, are incapable of being 
property.80  In setting out why some pre-published ideas cannot be 
property, it should be evident why the ideas with which I am concerned –
those protected in idea-submission law–could be the objects of property.  I 
then go on to show why in fact they are not.
To understand how our concept of property is at odds with the 
kind of interest we have in some but not other pre-published ideas, we 
need to conceive of the progress of an idea from conception to publication 
in three stages:
77 See Desny, 46 Cal. 2d at 732 (“it is clear that California does not now accord 
individual property type protection to abstract ideas.”)  See also Dallier v. Levi Strauss & 
Co., 86 F.3d 1149, *3 (4th Cir 1996) (unpublished) (noting that it is settled that there is no 
property in ideas under California law, and that, even though plaintiff argued that Virginia 
law, not California law applies, the plaintiff did not establish that the law is different in 
Virginia).  Although a property theory is certainly not viable in California, Professor Sobel’s 
claim in 1994 that a property theory is superfluous is not accurate in the context of other 
jurisdictions, even if, as I argue here, it should be.  See Sobel, supra note 7 at 28 (arguing that 
it is clear property theory no longer is viable).
78 See e.g. James Buchanan, Property as a Guarantor of Freedom (1993). 
79 The Duffy court for example drew from patent law.  See Duffy, 123 F. Supp 2d at 
809.
80 Justice Brandeis strongly expressed the view that there cannot be a right—good 
against the world—to exclude others from using ideas.  See International News Service v. 
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis J. dissenting.)  See also Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac MacPherson, Aug 13, 1813, cited in Adam Mossof, “What is 
Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,” 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 377-78 (2003) (ideas 
cannot be property); Edwin Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL & PUB. AFFAIRS
31, 35 (1989).
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        Pre-publication Published 
At stage one, when an idea is only to be found in the mind of the 
originator, ideas are bound up with the thinker: they are just a part of the 
thinker’s consciousness or internal mental activity.  Naturally, a person is 
privileged to control how and when to divulge novel and original ideas at 
this stage and is under no obligation to do so.81  Thus, Warren and 
Brandeis, in their famous article on privacy, wrote: “The common law 
secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what 
extent his thoughts, sentiments and emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”82  But this privilege is not a right to exclude others.  Because ideas 
are not at this first stage external to the person thinking them, they are not 
protected by a “property right.”  This is simply because property rights 
concern not our persons (of which our inner consciousness or our mind is a 
part) but rather external things in the world.  David Hume made this point 
when he noted that the principal disturbance in society, which necessitates 
the creation of property rights, arises from the peculiar character of things 
“which we call external”:  “their looseness and easy transition from one 
person to another.”83  Property rules arise to put these external goods on 
the same footing as the “fixed and constant advantages of the mind,” in 
which we are secure without the aid of property rights.84  James Penner also 
81 There is in general no standing obligation to disclose novel and original ideas 
(although one could conceivably contract to do so and a person in certain regulated 
relationships may come under a duty to disclose information, such as a seller’s duty to 
disclose known latent defects).  See Lynn Sharp Paine, Secrets and the Justifications of 
Intellectual Property: A Comment on Hettinger, 20 PHIL. AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 247, 251 (1991).
82 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
198 (1890-91).
83 DAVID HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (1740) Book 3 (“Of Morals”), Part II, 
Section 2.
84 Id.  Hume earlier distinguished between our thoughts and our external 
possessions:   “There are different species of goods, which we are possess'd of; the internal 
satisfaction of our minds, the external advantages of our body, and the enjoyment of such 
possessions as we have acquir'd by our industry and good fortune. We are perfectly secure in 
the enjoyment of the first. The second may be ravish'd from us, but can be of no advantage to 
him who deprives us of them.  The last only are both expos'd to the violence of others, and 
may be transferr'd without suffering any loss or alteration; while at the same time, there is 
Stage One Stage Two Stage Three
In the mind of the originator. Shared 
confidentially with 
one or a few 
individuals.
Released to the 
world.
18 POWERS-BASED APPROACH                       [200_
explains the importance of externality (what he calls separability) in 
understanding whether a thing may qualify as an object of property.  A 
thing may be property if it is separable from—that is, not necessarily linked 
to—the putative owner.85  The contingency of a person’s association with a 
thing (what Hume describes as the “looseness and easy transition” of 
things) explains how an object of property can be passed from owner to 
owner without triggering any legal change from the perspective of third 
parties.  Because a thing is only contingently associated with its current 
owner, the new owner will stand in the same position with respect to the 
thing as the old owner, and the duty of others not to interfere with the 
thing will be unaffected by such a transfer.86  Before an idea has been 
launched into the world, it does not have this critical attribute of property: 
it is (by definition at stage one) internal to the owner—an aspect of her 
mind.
The fact that ideas might be separable at another stage (as indeed 
they are) does not change our analysis of the status of ideas in this first 
stage.  Certainly, something that is separable has the potential to be an 
object of property (and this is a necessary condition of its becoming an 
object of property) but it cannot be the object of property until it is at the 
stage that it could be treated as conceptually separate from the person.  
This is most clearly evident in the context of body parts.  It makes no sense 
to us to speak of a property right in my blood while it is coursing through 
my veins, although it is of course separable.  But once I draw my blood into 
a container, I may have property in the extracted blood.  Someone who 
then runs off with the vessel of blood or pours it down a drain has not 
committed a battery and has not interfered with my bodily integrity, but 
has stolen or converted my property.  The first step in this argument holds 
true with ideas too: an idea that has not left my head cannot be the object of 
property in this state because it is simply a part of me or my consciousness.  
Idea-submission law however concerns pre-published ideas that have been 
submitted in confidence to another (stage two).  At this stage, the idea has 
been communicated to another human being but not to people generally.87
Although the idea of course remains in my head, it also exists at this point 
in someone else’s head too.  Thus, it has a separate existence in the world 
not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one's desires and necessities.”  [my 
emphasis.]  HUME, supra note 83, Book 3 (“Of Morals”) Part I, Section I.
85 PENNER, IDEA OF PROPERTY, supra note 13 at 111-12.
86 Id.
87 A study of the English law of breach of confidence might require that a closer 
look at what happens when an idea is recorded by the originator (either written or 
represented in another fashion) but is not communicated to anyone.  See The Observer and 
the Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14 E.H.R.R. 153 (1992) (in obiter, saying that someone 
may be bound by a duty not to disclose ideas that are written down in a private journal fall 
into her hands.)  Idea-submission law in the U.S., however, is more narrowly circumscribed: 
it concerns the legal protection offered an originator of a novel idea who submits the idea in 
question to the recipient (i.e. who shares it in confidence.)  
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such that another human being can access and use it without first 
compelling me to disclose it.  Other constraints aside,88 courts could 
conceivably treat pre-published ideas at stage two as property. The 
important question is: is this in fact what courts are doing in awarding 
originators of novel ideas a degree of protection against those with whom 
they share the ideas?
Ideas at stage two are not property but this is not, as we have 
established, because they are categorically incapable of being the objects of 
property.  Rather, ideas are not property because a property theory would 
inexactly describe the kind of rights-duty relationship that is in fact at work 
in idea-submission law. Property rights are in rem rights exclusively to 
control the use of a thing correlating to duties in rem not to interfere with 
another’s thing.  The in rem nature of property rights refers to their 
exigeability: they are rights good against the world or an indefinite number 
of duty-owers.  Property rights thus resolve potential conflicts between X 
and an indefinite number of others with respect to the use of an object of 
property in favor of X.89
 At stage 2 (where the originator has shared the idea confidentially 
with one or a few) courts do not treat the originator of the idea as pitted 
against the rest of the world in claiming exclusive control over and use of 
the idea.  Rather they are concerned with the originator’s right as against 
one or a few others with whom she has shared the idea confidentially.  The 
focus in idea-submission law on the relationship between the originator 
and a certain recipient of the idea is consistent with a rights-duty 
relationship that is in personam.  Even in New York, a jurisdiction that 
continues to use the rhetoric of property, one court frankly observed: “And 
while the idea disclosure cases generally refer to the idea in suit as the 
plaintiff’s claimed ‘property,’ the decisions have focused primarily on the 
relationship between the parties (or lack thereof) and not on any a priori 
recognition of exclusivity in the idea.”90
We cannot look to property theory to uncover the source of the 
duty not to use or disclose another’s idea shared in confidence for the 
simple reason that idea-submission law concerns a more limited or in 
personam rights-duty relationship than the in rem rights-duty relationship 
that property law describes.
An Unjust Enrichment Account
88 And preemption is of course a considerable impediment to doing so.  See Barrett, 
supra note 7 at 725 (property theory should be preempted pursuant to § 301 of the 
Copyright Act).
89 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (Clarendon Press, 1988) at 
38.
90 See e.g. Vantage Point, 529 F. Supp. at 1216.
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An unjust enrichment account is the most compelling of the 
accounts conventionally offered to explain why courts may order 
defendants to pay over to the originator the value of an idea shared in 
confidence.  Unjust enrichment occurs when: “(1) the plaintiff conferred a 
benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant retains the benefit; and (3) 
under the circumstances, the defendant's retention of the benefit is 
unjust.”91  On a claim of unjust enrichment in the context of idea-
submission law,92 the defendant’s liability for the use or disclosure of the 
plaintiff's ideas appears to be a function of the free acceptance of a valuable 
service that was not extended gratuitously.93  Such an account is untenable 
in the special context of idea-submissions because it strains the law’s 
protection of a recipient of unwanted or unchosen services. 
The doctrine of free acceptance can be seen both as a basis for 
finding a person unjustly enriched and as a limit on the law’s protection of 
innocent parties from liability to risk-takers who voluntarily confer alleged 
(but not incontrovertible94) benefits.95  If a person freely accepts a service, 
91 News World Communications, Inc. v. Thompsen, 878 A2d 1218, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); See Vereen v. Clayborne, 623 A.2d 1190, 1994 (D.C. 1993) (if recipient of idea has not 
realized any benefit from use of idea, then he or she cannot be said to have been enriched).
92 In the context of idea-submission cases most unjust enrichment claims are for 
restitution of quantum meruit or the value of services rendered.  See e.g. Matarese, 158 F.2d at 
634 (plaintiff brought claim for quantum meruit).  Quantum valebat, which measures unjust 
enrichment in terms of the value of the use of another’s property, is rarely used, largely 
because it is dependent on a prior claim to property in ideas, which has been rejected in 
some jurisdictions outright and in any case is flawed (see section III(A)(1) supra.).  See
Weitzenkorn, 40 Cal. 2d at 778 et seq. (a claim for quantum valebat is made out where the 
defendant used for his benefit the property of the plaintiff); Thompson, 150 Cal. App. 2d at 
473 (“because there is no property interest in ideas,” a quantum valebat theory of unjust 
enrichment is untenable.)
93 In the context of idea-submission cases, it is not perfectly clear whether free 
acceptance is sufficient grounds for finding unjust enrichment or whether something more, 
like a request, is required.  A reading of the cases suggests that, where a benefit is requested 
it can also be said to be freely accepted, but even unrequested benefits support an action in 
unjust enrichment.   See Smith v. Recrion, 91 Nev. 666 (Sup. Ct. Nev. 1975) (denying 
compensation because the idea was unsolicited and “one who officiously confers a benefit 
on another is not entitled to compensation therefore”); see Werlin, 528 F. Supp.  at 466 
(finding this to be a “classic case” of unjust enrichment because defendant in fact 
encouraged the plaintiff to submit ideas over the years.); but see Matarese, 158 F. 2d at 634 
(“the doctrine [of unjust enrichment] is applicable in a situation where, as here, the product 
of an inventor’s brain is knowingly received and used by another to his own great benefit 
without compensating the inventor.”); Flemming, 107 N.J. Super at 156  (accepting the 
possibility of establishing unjust enrichment for an unsolicited idea but rejecting claim 
because idea not novel and ultimately not used); Weitzenkorn, 40 Cal. 2d at 794-95 (unjust 
enrichment turns on “benefit accepted” not benefit requested: “[unjust enrichment] is based 
upon benefit accepted or derived for which the law implies an obligation to pay;”)  Trenton 
Indus., 165 F. Supp. at 531-32 (unjust enrichment found where defendant accepts but does 
not solicit idea).
94 See Gareth Jones, Restitutionary Claims for Services Rendered, 93 The Law Quarterly 
Review, 273, 276 (1977) (incontrovertible benefits (receipt of money or the avoidance of an 
inevitable expense because of plaintiff’s services) are presumed to be freely accepted (or at 
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having had the opportunity to refuse it, he may come under a duty to give 
back its reasonable value to the service-provider;96 however, if the 
defendant neither requested the service nor was even given the 
opportunity to refuse it, we treat the service-provider as an officious 
intermeddler who is not entitled to restitution.97
The question that I confront here is the basis on which the 
defendant can be said to have had an opportunity to reject an alleged 
benefit.  As a starting point, the defendant cannot be said to have had the 
choice to accept or reject a benefit—and thus to have come under a duty to 
least not open to subjective devaluation)); Michael Garner, The Role of Subjective Benefit in the 
Law of Unjust Enrichment, 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studs. 42, 44 (1990) (discussing 
exceptional circumstances in which a claim for restitution cannot be resisted).
95 PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 280 (1985); Jones, 
Restitutionary Claims for Services Rendered, supra note 94 at 275.  Scholars hotly debate the 
precise role of free acceptance in the law of unjust enrichment.  On the debate between Peter 
Birks and Andrew Burrows on free acceptance, see Michael Garner, The Role of Subjective 
Benefit in the Law of Unjust Enrichment, 10 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDS. 42 (1990).  See also
Lionel Smith, Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2115, 2143 (1999) 
(noting that free acceptance is controversial, and pointing out that it has a role in a 
corrective justice account of unjust enrichment.)  While there is debate about the proper role 
of free acceptance and whether something more, such as request, is needed to establish 
subjective benefit (a position associated with Andrew Burrows), at minimum it is agreed 
that the law of unjust enrichment must attend to the defendant’s freedom of choice.  If the 
defendant cannot even be said to have freely accepted the benefit, let alone to have 
requested it, it is not possible to show unjust enrichment unless, perhaps, there is an 
incontrovertible benefit.  See note 94, supra (on incontrovertible benefit).  While it may be 
that even establishing free acceptance is not enough to establish unjust enrichment in the 
context of unrequested benefits, it is a necessary (if insufficient) safeguard against officious 
intermeddling.
96 See note 93, supra.  For more general support of the doctrine of free acceptance in 
American law, see Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco 
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GEORGIA LAW REV. 847, 848 (1999) 
(straightforward application of unjust enrichment in cases where defendant freely accepted 
a benefit, knowing it was not being offered gratuitously); see also Wendy Gordon et al., 
Enforcing Coasean Bribes for Non-price Benefits, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1561 (1994). Note that 
on some accounts a showing of free acceptance makes the defendant liable to pay back the 
full value of the services he freely accepted rather than simply to disgorge his material 
gains.  Jones, supra note 94 at 275 (“ Because [acceptance] was his own unhampered choice] 
it is irrelevant to inquire whether or not he has obtained any real benefit, such as a net 
increase in his assets from their receipt.”); see also Restatement (Restitution) Third, § 9 
comment c.  See also Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936, 938 (reasonable value of services 
awarded where “one renders services at the request of another with the expectation of pay 
therefore and in the process confers a benefit on the other.”)  Cf. Werlin, 528 F. Supp. at 467 
(stating that ordinarily the measure of compensation not market value of services but the 
actual value of the benefit to the defendant but, because no evidence of defendants profits, 
court awarded what it deemed “proper, equitable and just under all the circumstances.”)
97 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., 34 Ch.D. 234, 248 (C.A. 1886).
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make restitution for the value of the service—unless he had “sufficient 
knowledge of the facts to make that choice a real one.”98
In the context of ideas, a defendant who is taken to have accepted a 
benefit by choosing to receive the idea makes the decision on “less than 
optimal criteria” because of what is known as Arrow’s paradox. 99   Arrow 
famously pointed out that a market in ideas faces certain natural 
impediments that arise from the very nature of ideas themselves.100  A 
seller and a buyer of ideas will have difficulties transacting business 
because an idea’s “value for the purchaser is not known until he has the 
information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost.”101  In the 
context of a claim for unjust enrichment, this paradox would prevent a 
plaintiff from claiming that a defendant freely accepted her idea because it 
is only after acceptance of the idea that the defendant is able to assess its 
value.  By way of illustration, consider a defendant who has accepted 
receipt of an idea, imagining that it would be of a certain kind.  On 
receiving it, however he finds that the idea is very close to what his own 
scientists were working toward.  Having faith in his own labs, and having 
sunk costs in coming up with a similar idea, he might have refused to 
receive the idea had he known in advance what it was.  He cannot be said 
to have freely accepted an idea that he would have rejected had he known 
what it was.   
But, it might be argued, an unjust enrichment claim can proceed on 
the basis that the service was freely accepted even though the defendant 
did not know in advance its exact value to him: No one ever can be sure 
until after a service is performed what quality of service he will receive.  It 
is, after all, inherent in the nature of a service that the final product cannot 
be inspected or fully assessed until it is a fait accompli.  It is important, 
however, to observe that there is a distinction between the impossibility of 
knowing for certain the value of a service until after it is provided from 
ignorance of the nature and potential value of the service that is about to be 
provided.  It may be that knowledge of the quality of the service need not 
be available for a person to be able to accept freely. But what knowledge 
then must a person have in order for there to be a meaningful opportunity 
to reject?  It seems that the most basic information a person must have in 
order to be said to have freely accepted the benefit is knowledge of the 
nature of the service that is provided and its potential value.  Take Peter 
98 BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 95 at 265; See also
Brown v. Brown, 524 A.2d 1184, 1186 (D.C. 1987) (“[P]romise to pay will be implied in law 
when one party renders valuable services that the other party knowingly and voluntarily 
accepts”) (my emphasis).
99 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention in 
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 615 (1962).
100 Id.
101 Id.
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Birks’ famous example of the home-owner, unjustly enriched by the 
services of a window-washer:
Suppose I see a widow-cleaner beginning to clean the windows of my 
house.  I know that he will expect to be paid.  So I hang back unseen till 
he has finished the job; then I emerge and maintain that I will not pay for 
the work that I never ordered.  It is too late; I have freely accepted the 
service.  I had my opportunity to send him away.  I chose instead to let 
him go on.  I must pay the reasonable value of his work.102
The exploitative home-owner may not know in advance how well 
the window-washer will perform and thus exactly what the service will 
end up being worth.103  But he does know the nature of the service and 
thus its potential value to him.  Now suppose the man he took to be a 
window-cleaner turned out to be a painter (approaching the house with a 
squeegee, but taking out a paint-brush and paint at the very last second).  
Or suppose the service-provider gave no clue, as he walked toward the 
house, of what performance would follow.  We would expect a home-
owner to wait for some sign of what service is to come before turning the 
man away.  If no sign is ever forth-coming—if the home-owner is unable to 
ascertain what sort of a service is about to come, while still leaving time 
enough for a refusal—then the homeowner cannot be said to have accepted 
the benefit with a real opportunity to reject–that is, with adequate 
knowledge of the facts.  On this reasoning in the context of ideas, the 
recipient of an idea ought not to be held liable for the value of having an 
idea brought to his attention if he does not first know at the very least the 
nature of the idea.
It might be argued, against my position, that the opportunity to 
reject or accept the idea occurs after receipt, at the point when, with 
knowledge of the nature of the idea, the defendant then decides to use or 
disclose the idea.  In other words, it might be said that the defendant has 
not accepted the benefit of an idea until he uses it and the decision to use is 
made with full knowledge of the nature of the idea.104  There is a problem 
with finding free acceptance in the decision to use or disclose the idea after 
receipt.  At this stage too the opportunity to reject the benefit is impaired.  
102 BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 95 at 265.
103 Presumably, a thorough cleaning that leaves not a speck of dust behind has 
greater objective value to the homeowner than a shoddy job.  A shoddy job not necessarily a 
bar to a claim in unjust enrichment, although, obviously, the amount in restitution that the 
plaintiff can claim will be less in the case of the job poorly done.
104 Freedman v. Beneficial Corp., 406 F.Supp. 917, 923 (D.Del.1975) (plaintiff who 
provided business ideas to “had a right to sue [for unjust enrichment] as soon as defendants 
began using his idea for their benefit”), cited in News World, 878 A2d. at 1224.
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Once a person possesses an idea, it may be that “he cannot help accepting 
the benefit”105 by using or disclosing the idea.  An idea once known exerts 
inevitable influence on the person who received it: “the moment (an idea) 
is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone and the receiver 
cannot dispossess himself of it.” 106
There is a second, related reason why it is unsatisfactory to find 
evidence of free acceptance in the decision to use or disclose the idea 
(rather than in the decision to receive the idea).  Where the defendant (or 
his agents) independently generates an idea very close to the one he 
received from the plaintiff, it will be very difficult for him to prove that he 
did not accept a benefit from the plaintiff.  Courts are already skeptical of 
defendants’ claims to have independently developed an idea substantially 
similar to the one received.  In Hoeltke v. CM Kemp Mfg, 107 the defendant 
chose to receive the plaintiff’s idea for an improvement on his device, 
thinking it was of a certain kind.  It turned out to be a fire check that (so the 
defendant claimed at trial) it was working on itself.  The court was not 
willing to believe, and the defendant was unable to prove, that it had 
indeed come up with the fire check itself.  As in Hoeltke, if a decision to use 
an idea is taken to be free acceptance of the benefit, the question of whether 
the defendant accepted or rejected the benefit becomes an evidentiary 
contest that he is likely to lose.  The defendant will find herself without an 
opportunity to reject a benefit in most cases but rather will be taken to have 
accepted the benefit of an idea unless she bars herself from freely pursuing 
her own ends involving the use of her independently generated idea.   The 
concern for freedom of choice, which the law of unjust enrichment aims to 
accommodate through the doctrine of free acceptance, would not be met on 
an unjust enrichment account of idea-submission law.
In sum, a meaningful opportunity to reject the benefit of an idea 
may not exist before the receipt of the idea but also—for different 
reasons—may not exist after the receipt of the idea in the decision to use or 
disclosure.   Idea-submission law and the law of unjust enrichment are in 
tension.  Actions for unauthorized use or disclosure of ideas would either 
violate a doctrinal premise of unjust enrichment (that there can be no 
liability without a meaningful opportunity to reject) or plaintiffs would
lose many more cases than they now do (because of the difficulty in 
showing free acceptance).  
B. Incomplete theories: Contract and Confidential 
Relationships 
105 Leigh v. Dickeson, 15 Q.B.D. 60 (C.A. 1884) quoted in PETER BIRKS, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 51 (2003).
106 Thomas Jefferson, quoted in Havigurst, supra note 12 at 300, n. 13.
107 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1936).
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On a contract-based theory of liability, courts must find the 
existence of a contract to pay for an idea.  The problem with collapsing 
idea-submission law into contract is that, simply put, it would stretch 
credulity to find a contract in all cases, although of course an express or 
implied-in-fact contract may indeed provide the source of the duty not to 
use or disclose another’s idea in some situations.108  As at least one court 
has recognized, the protection of ideas “reaches and renders liable persons 
other than the limited number who may have consented to a contractual 
relationship.”109
Courts have resorted to implying contracts to cover circumstances 
in which recipients have encouraged disclosure or have, however 
ambiguously, suggested that compensation for use may be arranged later 
on.  In a typical case in which a contract might be implied, the recipient 
indicates a willingness to review the idea or indeed solicits the idea, 
knowing that compensation is expected or agrees to receive an unsolicited 
idea, coupled with a promise that she will not divulge the idea or that she 
will discuss compensation if the idea proves useful to her.  Implied 
contract might be a source of a duty of non-use or disclosure where the 
conduct of the parties permits the inference of a promise.  However, 
implied contract fails to provide an account of idea-submission cases
generally. 
The most important limit to explaining idea-submission law 
generally in terms of contract principles relates to the requirement that, for 
there to be an implied contract, the submission must be for the purpose of 
108 Initially it was thought that the obstacles to a contract-theory of idea-submission 
law concerned problems with consideration, statute of frauds and preemption.  The courts 
have for all intents and purposes waved these issues aside.  See Sobel, supra note 7 at 23 
(courts have not taken any of these consideration, statute of fraud and pre-emption issues –
identified as problems by Nimmer --to be fatal to a claim under contract law.)  The 
consideration problem is resolved in some jurisdictions by insisting on the novelty 
standard.  An important initial objection to a contract approach was that there is no 
consideration in an idea-submission situation where a person does not “own” the idea.  
Courts used to reject contract claims on the basis that a non-novel idea could not serve as 
valuable consideration.  See Murray, 844 F.2d at 994.  The Apfel court, however, has changed 
the law in NY, indicating that novelty is evidence of valid consideration but not a necessary 
element of a claim.  See Apfel, 81 N.Y.2d at 477.  See also Nadel, 208 F.3d at 379-80 (abrogating 
Murray).  A struggle on this issue persisted for quite some time in the case law of various 
jurisdictions.  See, for example, Smoley v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 106 F. 2d 314, 315 (3d Cir. 
1969) (an idea disclosed in confidence may be protected by an implied agreement to refrain 
from use, but only where it is novel). California courts by contrast quite early on felt that the 
act of disclosure constituted valuable consideration.  See note 32 supra (California courts find 
the act of disclosure consideration enough.)  It is also quickly becoming a settled question 
that contracts to pay for idea-disclosure are not pre-empted by federal law.  See Barrett, 
supra note 7 at 724.   See also Pro CD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447, 1454-55 (7th Cir.) 
109 See Fink, 9 Cal. App. 3d at 1010 (referring to cases resolved under breach of 
confidence and unjust enrichment theories.).  
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selling the idea.110  Thus, the originator of the idea must have clearly 
conditioned his offer to convey the idea upon a promise to pay for it if 
used,” by the recipient” and “the recipient must know the condition and 
must voluntarily accept its disclosure.”111
Implied-contract theory cannot explain cases where an originator 
shares an idea with another purpose in mind–to entice the recipient to 
enter into a business relationship,112 or to acquire a trademark, for 
example.113  Expectation of being paid for the idea itself is critical to the 
implied contract to pay for use, which makes the implied contract useful in 
some cases but certainly not broad enough to cover idea-submission cases 
that are now being treated inadequately under unjust enrichment theory or 
the law of confidential relationships.
The law of confidential relationships is similarly insufficient in its 
reach.   In order to treat the relationship between originator and recipient of 
an idea as a confidential relationship, the courts would have to find either 
that the parties are in a recognized fiduciary relationship or that the 
originator reposed trust in the recipient, the recipient accepted that trust 
and purported to act with the originator’s best interests in mind.114 While 
in some cases the parties may be in a true confidential relationship, it is not 
necessarily the case that there is a relationship of trust or intimacy in all 
situations in which courts protect ideas through idea-submission law.115
In an effort to close the gap between the law of confidential 
relationships and the protection of novel, original, concrete and 
confidential ideas, courts resort to an expansive definition of a confidential 
110 See Keane, Fed. Appx. at 876 (plaintiff “did nothing to indicate that disclosure of 
his idea was contingent on payment.  Consequently, the district court correctly concluded 
that the defendants' acceptance of plaintiff's idea cannot be taken as an implied 
acceptance”); Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 92 (2nd Cir. 1984) (originator cannot recover 
unless he has obtained a promise to pay or the conduct of the offeree reflects an intent to 
pay for the proffered idea). 
111 Sobel, supra note 7 at 39.
112 Faris, 97 Cal. App.3d at 309 (no implied in fact contract where plaintiff submits 
idea for TV show in order to convince defendant to join him as masters of ceremony.  
Defendant then turned around and made a similar show himself without plaintiff.)
113 Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 489 (Initial disclosure of idea for a book of scrabble 
strategies was in order to get defendant’s approval to use the Scrabble trademark on it and 
not in order to obtain compensation. This initial disclosure, without more, would not permit 
inference of an implied in fact contract.); Kleck v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 145 F.Supp.2d 819, 
825 (W.D. Tx. 2000) (no intent to sell marketing idea communicated as part of effort to 
obtain joint venture and therefore no implied contract). 
114A confidential relationship exists “where one has gained the confidence of the 
other and purports to act or advise with the other’s interest in mind…. It is particularly 
likely to exist where there is a family relation or one of friendship or such a relation of 
confidence as that which arises between physician and patient or priest and penitent.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2, cmt. b (1959).  This does not describe the relationship 
of the “idea man” trying to leverage his power to create duties in others with respect to his 
ideas into payment for their use.  See also Sobel, supra note 7 at 53.
115 See Sobel, supra note 7 at 24 (“ true confidential relationships” are quite rare.)
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relationship that includes circumstances in which the submission is 
confidential even if the relationship is not more generally one of trust and 
confidence.  The California Court of Appeal in Faris, for instance, held that 
while a confidential relationship is not created from the mere submission 
of an idea to another, it was enough if there was “evidence of the 
communication of the confidentiality of the submission or evidence from which 
a confidential relationship can be inferred.116  The court went on to 
stipulate that “proof that the material submitted was protected by reason 
of sufficient novelty and elaboration” was, quite apart from proof of a 
particular relationship such as partners, joint adventurers, principal and 
agent or buyer and seller under certain circumstances, sufficient to support 
an inference of the existence of a confidential relationship.117  In short, to 
shelter idea-submission law within the law of confidential relationships 
without sacrificing the traditional scope of protection would require courts 
to assert the existence of a confidential relationship where there is not one 
in fact.118
There are limits to how far established legal categories can or should be 
bent to accommodate all situations in which a recipient of an idea comes 
under a duty not to use or disclose ideas.  Implying confidential 
relationships or contracts in defiance of the facts undermines the utility of 
our legal concepts and the predictability and clarity that the law might 
otherwise have.  As Warren and Brandeis noted, in arguing for a new right 
to privacy:
116 Faris, 97 Cal. App.3d at 323 (emphasis added).
117 Id.
118 See Hoeltke, 80 F.2d at 923 (finding a “confidential relationship” where plaintiff 
“offered to disclose his invention to defendant with a view of selling it to defendant, and so 
stated in his letter.  Defendant was interested in the proposition and invited the disclosure; 
otherwise it would not have seen complainant's specification and drawings until the patent 
was granted. While there was no express agreement that defendant was to hold the 
information so disclosed as a confidential matter and to make no use of it unless it should 
purchase the invention, we think that in equity and good conscience such an agreement was 
implied; and having obtained the disclosure under such circumstances, defendant ought not 
be heard to say that there was no obligation to respect the confidence thus reposed in it.)  
Faris, 97 Cal. App.3d at 313, the court makes the mistake of treating the protection of ideas 
in such cases (as well as situations in which there is a contract implied-in-fact) as a species 
of confidential relationship:  “Among the factors from which [an inference of a confidential 
relationship] can be drawn are: proof of the existence of an implied-in-fact contract; proof 
that the material submitted was protected by reason of sufficient novelty and elaboration; or 
a proof of a particular relationship such as partners … principal and agent or buyer and 
seller….”  That said, there are situations in which the relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant is indeed a fiduciary one.  See e.g. Johnson v. Schmidt, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. 
Conn. 2000) (finding a fiduciary obligation of supervisors not to appropriate ideas of 
graduate students).
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So long as these circumstances happen to present a contract upon which 
such a term can be engrafted upon the judicial mind, or to supply 
relations upon which a trust or confidence can be erected, there may be 
no objection to working out the desired protection through the doctrines 
of contract or trust.  But the court can hardly stop there.119
“New applications of traditional theories”120 have not satisfactorily 
accounted for the source of the duty not to use or disclose another’s novel 
idea.  The hodge-podge of legal theories mustered to explain idea-
submission law under – rather than over – explains idea-submission law.  
These theories, singly or together, fail to account for the formal legal 
origins of the duty not to use or disclose another’s idea.
III. The Juridical Source of the Duty not to Use or Disclose Another’s 
Idea: A Legal Power
A good account of the source of the duty not to use or disclose 
another’s novel idea strives for internal coherence, fit with the core criteria 
of the positive law and also consistency with the idea of obligation implicit 
in other well-established areas of Anglo-American law.  In this section, I set 
out a unifying theory of idea-submission law that accounts for the juridical 
source of the duty not to use or disclose another’s idea in terms of powers.  
The account I offer here provides a general account of the source of the 
duty without distorting existing categories of obligation.  At the same time, 
it makes sense of the core criteria for protection that have given shape to 
idea-submission law.   Finally, a powers-based account brings conceptual 
clarity to idea-submission law and reveals something of the moral reasons 
that motivate this area of law.
A. The Source of the Duty: A Legal Power
The normative change that occurs when a person submits her novel 
idea to another in confidence is best explained as the result of the exercise 
of a legal power to control the extent to which one shares one’s pre-
published novel ideas with another.  On this account, the source of the 
recipient’s duty not to use or disclose a novel, original idea is the 
originator’s legal power with respect to her own ideas to create such a duty 
in those with whom she shares the idea in confidence.  As Warren and 
Brandeis recognized in the context of privacy rights: “Under our system of 
government, [an individual] can never be compelled to express [his 
thoughts] (except when upon the witness-stand); and even if he has chosen 
to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of 
119 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 82 at 210.  
120 See Nimmer, Idea-submission Law, supra note 25 at 119 (1953-54).
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the publicity which shall be given them.”121  Similarly, a power to control 
the extent to which one shares one’s idea is the source of duties in 
recipients not to disclose or use novel, original, concrete and confidential 
ideas without permission.  By sharing her novel idea in confidence with a 
voluntary recipient (more on that later), the originator creates in herself a 
right to control the use or disclosure of that idea that is exclusive at least as 
against the defendant.  This right and its correlating duty are in personam: 
the legal relationship that the originator creates is between herself and a 
single person (rather than herself and a very large and indefinite class of 
people). 122
B. Beyond Unity: Conceptual Implications of a Powers-
Based Account
A single and distinct source for the recipient’s duty suggests that 
idea-submission law is a unified if narrow branch of law. Treating a 
restriction on the use or disclosure of an idea as the result of the exercise of 
a legal power rather than as an occurrence by operation of law has several 
additional conceptual implications.  First, the formal nature of legal powers 
suggests a limit on the scope of the protection of ideas: an originator must 
intend to bind the recipient of the idea if the source of the duty not to use 
or disclose another’s idea is the exercise of a power.  Second, the way in 
which we identify the exercise of a legal power (by the kind of reasons that 
justify it) importantly guides our thinking about moral questions to do 
with the justification of idea-submission law.  Specifically, a powers-based 
account suggests the reasons that motivate idea-submission law have to do 
with the value of enabling the originator to control disclosure, and not 
directly to do with the desirability of restricting the use or disclosure of 
ideas in particular cases.
1) Formal Features of Powers: Decision and Intention
The formal features of legal powers may explain certain positive 
aspects of idea-submission law.  A legal power is at work in the law where 
121 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 82 at 198. I will argue that a similar power is at 
work here, in the context of novel and original ideas. 
122 For a definition of in personam rights, or what Hohfeld calls “paucital rights,” see
HOHFELD, supra note 16 at 72
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a person’s decision to bring about a change in legal relations (to bind 
someone where otherwise they were at liberty, for instance, or to grant 
them a privilege where otherwise they were under a duty) is given legal 
recognition.123
The exercise of a legal power entails decision–in other words, an 
intention to bring about the legal change.124  By contrast, intent to bring 
about a change in legal relations is not a necessary characteristic of events 
that trigger legal changes by operation of law.  These events might not 
always even be the result of human action. For example, when a person 
reaches the age of maturity, this natural event triggers the acquisition of 
new powers such as the right to vote, to make valid, binding contracts and 
to join the military.  Similarly, when a person’s spouse dies, she acquires 
anew the ability to enter a binding marriage, which (at least in a state that 
does not permit bigamy) she did not have before.125 And even where 
human conduct is a relevant determinant of legal consequences that arise 
by operation of law, the actor’s intent to bring about that change will be 
irrelevant to the occurrence of those legal changes.126
There is room for disagreement on the interpretation of the 
meaning of decision in the context of the exercise of a legal power.  One 
view is that, if the exercise of a power is a decision to bring about the 
normative change, then the exercise of a legal power requires subjective
intent to bring about the consequences.127  This view, however, construes 
123 PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW, supra note 13 at 17 (“a normative power 
is the normative ability or capacity to change one’s own or another’s normative position by 
modifying, creating or destroying rules, rights, duties or other powers.”).  See also Joseph 
Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 79, 80 (1972).  
An early, influential but arguably incomplete definition of legal powers was famously 
offered by W. N. HOHFELD, supra note 16 at 51 (a power-holder is one on whom the law has 
conferred paramount volitional control over facts that bring about legal change.)  See also 
Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld’s Contribution to the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721 (1919) (a 
Hohfeldian power “has the legal ability by doing certain acts to alter legal relations.”)
124 This is the position taken by Andrew Halpin.  See Andrew Halpin, The Concept 
of a Legal Power, 16 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDS. 129, 140 (1996).   I will argue, infra, that this 
position, properly construed is not contrary to the position taken by Joseph Raz in 
PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS 104 (Hutchinson & Co, 1975) (definition of powers not 
concerned with intentions but with reasons for enabling the power-holder).  See note 129, 
infra and accompanying text.
125  Halpin, supra note 124 at 140 n. 51 (making the point that a power to marry 
revests itself on death of spouse).
126 A classic example of a normative change arising through operation of law is the 
law’s response to criminal conduct.  When a person commits a crime, he is then liable to a 
judge’s power to sentence him.  This is true whether or not the criminal intended to bring 
about that result (where, for instance he hoped to gain a free night in jail—the Supertramp 
example).
127 This is Halpin’s view.  See Halpin, supra note 124 at 144, This of course would 
significantly narrow the range of actions that we consider exercises of a normative power 
and would exclude the treatment of implied-in-fact contracts as the exercise of a legal 
power to contract.  Id. 146 (“Upon this analysis [of the exercise of powers in terms of 
decisions] we would have to deny that [an objective contract] was the exercise of a power.”)  
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the meaning of decision in the context of law too narrowly.  Intention to 
bring about a normative change is a salient aspect of decision.  But 
intention may be inferred (objectively) from conduct or circumstances.128
Thus, we can speak of a person’s having exercised a power to contract 
where there is objective evidence of intention to bind herself.  This position 
is consistent with Joseph Raz’s approach.  Raz has acknowledged that, 
normally, only acts done with the intention to bring about the legal change 
count as the exercise of a legal power.129  However, the  “exceptions” to this 
general observation (he refers to implied-in-fact contract) led him to 
conclude that the definition of powers does not turn on intentions. 130   Raz 
was primarily concerned with including the formation of objective contract 
in the category of legal powers.   Keeping this in mind, it seems that Raz’s
reservations about intention are really reservations about subjective
intention, which he was quite right to say is normally, but not always, 
present in the exercise of a power. Raz does not suggest, however, that an 
action can be the exercise of a legal power in the absence of any evidence 
(objective or otherwise) of intent to bring about that legal change.  It is 
consistent with Raz’s position to insist that there is no exercise of a legal 
power where there cannot even objectively be said to be expressions of a 
decision to bring about that legal change. 
Circumstances of which a person is entirely ignorant cannot 
constitute the expression of a decision to bring about a change.  Where 
someone finds a lost thing or steals it, the law’s response is to hold the 
finder or thief liable to return the thing in vindication of the true owner’s 
title (if, in the case of a finder, the true owner can be found).131   The law 
also imposes a duty to return the value of money paid in error on the 
ground that the payor’s ignorance of the fact of the payment explains why 
the enrichment of the payee is unjust.132  In these cases, it is quite clear that 
the source of the duty to return the thing or make restitution of the value of 
128 This point was suggested by an e-mail conversation with Michael Pratt.
129 Identifying powers by looking at whether certain actions standardly are 
directed at bringing about a normative change rules out from the class of legal powers 
situations in which some intend to bring about by certain legal consequences what others 
standardly do not (the Supertramp for instance who breaks the law in order to get arrested, 
so that he can have a warm, safe place to sleep) but includes cases where some do not 
subjectively intend by certain actions what others standardly do (implied in fact contracts). 
And yet, in these latter cases, the actor at the very least objectively intends what others 
standardly intend before she or he is held to have exercised a power.  Indeed, the standard 
behavior is likely to serve as a gauge of what an act objectively tells us about the power-
holder’s intention. 
130 See RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 124 at 104.
131  36A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM §3 (Rights and duties of finder vis à vis owner).
132 Ewan McKendrick, Restitution, Misdirected Funds and Change of Position, 55 MLR 
377 (1992) (discussing Peter Birks’ suggestion that ignorance is an unjust factor.)
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the money paid arises by operation of law and not by the exercise of a legal 
power by the owner.  This is because, where the owner was wholly 
unaware of the circumstances of the loss or theft, we cannot find an 
expression of a decision by the original owner to bind the finder or thief. 
The decisional aspect of legal powers suggests a limit on the scope 
of protection offered by idea-submission law.  In this context, the 
originator must intend to restrict the use or disclosure of the idea by the 
recipient and where she does not (because the idea is shared inadvertently 
or even without her knowledge), she will not create a binding duty of non-
use or disclosure in the recipient.133  Thus, if the source of the duty not to 
use or disclose is a legal power, the originator cannot be said to create a 
duty in others in circumstances in which the idea is discovered without her 
knowledge.  When a snoop finds out another’s idea, or when a person 
receives the idea from a third party, without the originator’s knowledge, 
we could not find the expression of a decision to restrict that person’s use 
or disclosure of that idea.  The conceptual limit suggested by the very idea 
of a legal power shapes our understanding of the limited scope of idea-
submission law in a way that is consistent with the positive law.  While 
courts have not offered much discussion on this point, idea-submission law 
appears to protect novel and original ideas only where the originator 
shares or submits the idea to another.134  Thus, a third party who comes to 
know of an idea through someone other than the originator is not liable to 
the originator’s power not to use or disclose the idea.135  In some 
circumstances, other rules of law from trade secret law, contract law, the 
133 See Sobel, supra note 7 at 25 (noting that courts do not protect ideas “where the 
person who originally disclosed the idea had no contact with the third person who 
eventually used it,” a restriction explained on a contract theory on the basis that there is no 
“privity of contract.”); see also Giangrasso v. CBS, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 472, 479 (1982) (common 
law protection of idea rejected because plaintiffs “never directly offered their script to any 
of the defendants.”)  
134 This limit to idea-submission law follows from the other theories of idea-
submission law, with the exception of a property-based account.  Thus, on an unjust 
enrichment account, one cannot be said to be enriched by the services of the originator 
when the service of disclosing the idea was provided by another.  Unless one takes the view 
that the idea is the property of the originator, there is no other basis on which to find that 
the originator has suffered a legal deprivation corresponding the benefit enjoyed by the 
third party from the use of the idea.  Similarly, where a person has not acquired an idea 
through a confidential relationship with the originator, there is no way to connect her 
personally to the originator.  Unless this connection is mediated through a res – an 
acknowledgement that there is property in ideas --there cannot be a duty not to use or 
disclose.    Cases in which officers of a corporation are bound not to use or disclose an idea 
that they was submitted in confidence to the corporation do not suggest otherwise.  In these 
cases, the officer (third party) is bound because of the nature of corporations and the fact 
that ultimately corporations are composed of people who act on its behalf.  See Davies v. 
Krasna, 245 Cal. App. 2d 535, 549 (1975).
135 See Vantage Point, 529 F. Supp. at 1214 (former employee submits plaintiff’s 
game idea to new employer, who was not aware of employee’s misconduct.  No duty not to 
use or disclose the idea where there is not also notice of misconduct).
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law of confidential relationships136 and tort law–specifically duties of non-
interference with the contractual or fiduciary relations of others137–may 
kick in to prevent use or disclosure of an idea without permission or at 
least compensation. But the core protection offered by idea-submission 
law is consistent with the requirement that the exercise of a power to create 
a duty not to use or disclose an idea in others must be intentional. 
2) Reasons for Conferring Power
Identifying the source of the recipient’s duty as a legal power also 
tells us something about the (moral) reasons why a recipient is bound not 
to use or disclose a novel idea that is shared in confidence.   We distinguish 
between a legal power and acts that the law treats as having legal 
consequences by looking to the kind of reasons that motivate the power-
conferring norm.  As Raz explained, “a legal power can be identified only 
by the reasons which led the law (i.e. the institutions which make and 
sustain it) to attach those legal consequences to the act.”138  A legal power is 
conferred, as Penner puts it, for the very purpose of enabling persons to 
make the normative changes they enable persons to make.139  Powers are 
conferred not on the basis of the value of the particular legal result that a 
person can bring about through the exercise of a legal power but rather the 
value of enabling people as the power does.  In other words, the moral 
reasons that justify the conferral of a power have to do with the desirability 
of enabling the originator of an idea to share his ideas in a limited way 
rather than the value of the outcome: the value of restricting a recipient’s 
use or disclosure.
A legal power to control use or disclosure serves the interest we all 
have in sharing something of ourselves with a select few, and thus serves 
136 Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 469 (1957).  The court 
acknowledged that a duty may exist where one is in a confidential relationship, or where 
one discovers the idea “by improper means,” which maybe interpreted narrowly to the 
acquisition of an information through legal misconduct, such as through a tort of inducing 
breach of contract or otherwise interfering with fiduciary relations.  See e.g., Joyce v General 
Motors Corp., 49 Ohio St. 3d 93, 97-101 (1990) (Holmes J., dissenting, noting that employee 
A may be protected against use of idea on a theory of interference with contractual 
relations.)
137 See Sobel, supra note 7 at 25 (interference with confidential or fiduciary relations 
may be a wrong: a third person who eventually uses an idea disclosed by the original 
recipient “could be held liable for doing so if he knew of that confidential relationship and 
that it was breached by the disclosure to him.”)
138 Joseph Raz, Legal Rights in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE 
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS, 251-52 (1994).
139 PENNER, supra note 13 at 17.  
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our more general interest in maximum freedom. 140  Our freedom is 
maximized in this context where the law does not simply secure an insular 
sphere of privacy (by for example, privileging people to choose not to 
divulge ideas to another) but rather where it enables people to share their 
ideas in a limited way with a select audience. 141  The power conferred in 
idea-submission law is motivated by the desirability of enabling people to 
engage others without requiring them to forego entirely any say as to the 
extent of that interaction.142
Perhaps the relationship of an originator’s power to this interest is 
best illuminated by considering in a general way how other powers also 
relate to our fundamental interest in controlling the scope of interaction. 
The power to control disclosure has two features in common with the 
power to consent to sexual relations, the power to acquire property and the 
power to contract.  These are general powers that all mature adults have143
rather than special powers that attach to some by virtue of their position.144
That is to say, we all have the power to control disclosure, as well as the 
power to contract, to acquire property and to consent to sexual relations, 
just in virtue of being legal subjects. 
Second, these general, stand-alone powers all serve our 
fundamental interest in being able to interact with others without 
foregoing our own control.  For example, the power to acquire property is 
140 Understood broadly to mean, “a freedom from coercion even in the 
performance of acts carried out where the world can see.”  See Eduardo Peñalver, Property as 
Entrance, 91 VA L. REV. 0, 10 (2005).   For a similar discussion in the context of trade secrets, 
see Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of Intellectual Property, 20 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 247 (1991).
141 See Paine, supra note 140 at  247-263.  She describes the moral backdrop for the 
right to control disclosure of ideas in terms of respect for autonomy, personality and 
privacy but also respect for freedom: “freedom of expression also implies a prima facie right 
not to express one’s ideas or to share them only with those we love or trust or with whom 
we wish to share.” Id. at 252.
142 The origins of idea-submission law reflect this focus.   California courts, for 
instance, saw idea-submission law as a direct response to the needs of screen-writers in 
Hollywood, who found it “necessary to submit ideas to … producers and not to develop 
them into complete works until and unless they [were] approved.  See Rokos v. Peck, 182 
Cal. App. 2d 604, 613 (1986), quoted in Sobel, supra note 7 at 19.
143 For instance, every mature person has a power to contract and to acquire 
property.  PENNER, supra note 13 at 51.
144 Special powers by contrast are powers that are vested in particular persons only 
in virtue of a position, event, or association specific to them.  For example, the power to 
arbitrate a dispute may be conferred by contract on a particular person, the power to 
adjudicate a case inheres in an appointed judge, the power to appoint a remainder-man, is 
conferred on a particular individual by a will.   Special rather than general powers that exist 
independently of contract, will or legislation and which are recognized at common law are 
typically nested within property rights.  For example, powers to share property (to grant 
others privileges to use) and to abandon or destroy it are considered incidents of property, 
and thus flow from ownership.   Others, such as the power to sell or to bequeath property, 
are not incidents of ownership but nonetheless cannot be exercised except with respect to 
things that one owns (and thus may be associated with property rights).
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conferred in recognition of our interest not just in acquiring a sphere of 
exclusivity but also in acquiring the means to engage the world.145  The 
right to exclusively decide the use of a thing thus carries with it a power to 
share that property with others.  But our interest in making social uses of 
our property is not best served by a simple on/off approach.  Thus, people 
expect to be able to invite friends over for an evening without at the same 
time being committed to opening their house to the entire neighborhood.  
Similarly, the power to consent to sex enables a person to privilege certain 
individuals to engage in otherwise prohibited action.  The power to 
consent in this context serves our interest to engage in limited sexual 
interactions with one, select individual without foregoing our control over 
the scope of that interaction or sexual interactions generally.  The law 
would not serve our interest in interacting with others without at the same 
time failing to serve our interest in our own autonomy if, say, it forced us 
to choose between being a sexually active person, whose rejection of 
someone is not legally significant, and being a sexually inactive person, 
who is protected in her wish not to interact sexually with others.  All of 
these general stand-alone powers enable the power-holder to engage with 
others, but not on an all-or-nothing basis.  Rather, these powers, like the 
power to control disclosure permit the power-holder to interact with others 
by degrees.
A powers-based account, in contrast to an account derived from the 
law of confidential relationships or the law of unjust enrichment, brings to 
light the justificatory core of idea-submission law.  Other conventional 
accounts would commit us to understanding the moral basis for the law in 
terms of the value of restricting a particular recipient (that is the value of 
the outcome) rather than the value of enabling people to bring about legal 
change.146  In other words, if the duty not to use or disclose another’s idea 
were created by a rule of law rather than by the exercise of a power, we 
should then be led to cast the moral backdrop of idea-submission law very 
differently, by reference to why it is desirable to restrict the recipient.147
145 See e.g. Penalver, supra note 140 (property’s function in enabling entrance is too 
often overlooked in the liberal fixation on property as exit).  See also PENNER, supra note 13 at 
74 (“The right to property permits the owner not only to make solitary use of his property 
by excluding all others but also permits him to make a social use of his property by 
selectively excluding others, which is to say by selectively allowing some to enter.”) 
146 See notes 138-42 supra and accompanying text.
147 Indeed, some have already been led to see idea-submissions law in these terms.   
This has already happened.  See Barrett, supra note 7 at 741 (asserting that both trade secret 
law and idea-submission law concern the inequities in the defendant’s behavior.); see also
Thompson, 150 Cal. App. 2d at 475 (This is we think a good deal like some aspects of the law
relating to trade secrets).
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IV. Voluntariness and Obligation
Idea-submission law is not concerned solely with the intent and 
actions of the originator of the idea.  The law is clear that the recipient of an 
idea comes under no duty if she neither voluntarily undertook the duty 
nor voluntarily put herself in a position to receive the idea.148  Why does 
the law not enable the originator of an idea to create a duty of non-
disclosure in another (and thus a limited right in herself to control use or 
disclosure), simply by blurting the idea out to her?  This is a question of 
some practical concern given that, in many cases in which the protection of 
ideas is sought, the defendant has not solicited the idea.  Indeed, we can 
discern a flavor of officiousness in the behavior of many plaintiffs: they 
often develop ideas for which they claim protection specifically with the 
defendant’s use in mind although not at the invitation of the defendant.149
In this section, I explain why a minimum foundation of 
voluntariness matters in my account of the duty not to use or disclose 
another’s idea. The answer lies simply with the limited bases on which 
Anglo-American law will recognize obligation: the interests of another 
cannot, contrary to Raz’s view, provide sufficient justification for the 
imposition of duties on specific persons.  There must be a further reason 
for finding that one person, rather than another, is the appropriate ower of 
the duty protecting that interest.  By voluntarily receiving the idea, a 
person creates a nexus between herself and the originator sufficient to 
render her liable not to use or divulge the originator’s idea without 
permission.
A. Special Duties and Voluntariness
Idea-submission law recognizes an in personam duty created by the 
exercise of a legal power in a particular recipient of a novel idea shared in 
confidence.  On what basis does the law select an individual from among 
its subjects to bear a duty that serves the interest of another?150  A good 
theory of obligation is consistent with the limited bases on which the 
148 See Thompson, 150 Cal. App. 2d at 476 (“A cannot impose a confidence on B 
without B’s consent.  If A discloses the secret to B despite B’s protest that he does not wish 
to hold in confidence and will not so hold if it is disclosed” then B does not come under a 
duty not to use or disclose.
149 See e.g. Hoeltke, 80 F.2d. at 914 in which the defendant took it upon himself to 
come up with a specific idea to improve the plaintiff’s product, and then sought to interest 
the plaintiff in it.  
150 This question is generally posed in the context of duties that arise by operation 
of law, in service of interests that are deemed sufficiently important to count as rights.  The 
same concern with the imposition of obligations is raised in the context of a power and a 
correlative liability, from which a duty flows (and I use “liability” in the Hohfeldian sense 
to refer to the one whose rights, duties or powers stand to be altered by the exercise of a 
power).  See note 16, supra.
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common law selects any particular individual to bear a duty that serves 
another’s interest. 151
The outer limits on the law’s ability to impose duties are set by the 
requirements of moral intelligibility.  John Gardner puts the point this way: 
There are limits to the law's ability, in the fashion of Humpty Dumpty to 
make things legally obligatory simply by designating them as legally 
obligatory.  Legal obligations must also satisfy what I like to call the 
'moral intelligibility' condition.  They must be such that, if only the law 
were justified, they would be moral obligations. Or to put the same point  
another way, it must make sense for those who regard the law as having a 
claim on their allegiance to regard their legal obligations as being among 
their moral obligations.152
Anglo-American law, however, evinces an even tighter restraint in 
imposing legal obligations.153  That is to say, in some cases where it might 
be said that an obligation could be understood as a moral obligation,
Anglo-American law nonetheless treats the nexus between duty-ower and 
rights-holder as insufficient to support a legal obligation.154  This will 
become clear when we consider the law’s unwillingness to recognize duties 
that automatically flow from inescapable positions, which, as Bernard 
Williams reminds us, may well generate some of our most basic moral 
duties.155  On what basis then does Anglo-American law take itself to be 
justified in imposing legal duties?
151 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Restoring Restitution, 91 VA L. REV. 861, 868 (2005) (book 
review) (identifying the “central theoretical question for any liability regime: Why is it that 
the law connects a particular plaintiff with a particular defendant?”).  I take up the question
without taking on a corrective justice approach, rather treating consistency with the bases 
on which Anglo-American law selects an appropriate duty-ower as a hallmark of a good 
theory of obligation.
152 John Gardner, Backwards and Forwards with Tort Law, forthcoming in Michael 
O'Rourke and Joseph Keim-Campbell (eds) Law and Social Justice (MIT Press 2005) at 22, 
available at <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lawf0081/progress.htm. 
153 I do not mean to suggest that Gardner would agree that the law is necessarily 
concerned with voluntariness in the imposition of obligation.  For instance, Gardner 
embraces the concept of the tragic in law, such that obligations may be imposed even where 
there is no possibility of meeting them.  See John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, in 
ANDREW SIMESTER AND A.T.H.  SMITH (EDS), HARM AND CULPABILITY (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996)
154 Not all systems of law exercise such restraint.  See for instance REBECCA WEST, 
BLACK LAMB, GREY FALCON: A JOURNEY THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA 46 (Edinburgh: Canongate 
Classics, 1993) (“In the Third and Fourth centuries, congregations were consistently 
insisting on electing people as bishops who were unwilling to accept the office…. 
Sometimes these men were so reluctant that the congregation was obliged to kidnap them
and ordain them forcibly.  But once they were installed as bishops, they often performed 
their duties admirably.”)
155 BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 7 (1985) (“it has been 
in every society a recognizable ethical thought, and remains so in ours, that one can be 
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 The propriety of imposing legal duties will depend on showing 
that there is “a relation of the right kind between the individual and the 
putative duty-ower such that it is appropriate that the latter should have 
that duty.”156  To justify a legal duty, it is not enough simply to point to the 
existence of an interest sufficiently important to be protected by a right 
(whether that right is created by operation of law or by the exercise of a 
legal power).157  James Penner identifies an important gap in the view that 
another’s legally protected interest is a sufficient and prior justification for 
the imposition of duties.158  Penner argues that “[n]ot only is [the 
justification of a right] dependent on a person’s having an interest of 
sufficient importance but it is also dependent on there being another 
person … upon whom it is appropriate to impose the correlative duty….  
We conceive of [rights] as imposing duties on a determinate set of duty-
holders: either an individual or… generally on everyone.” 159
As Penner points out, the assumption that a nexus between a 
rights-holder and duty-ower exists “is more difficult to make in the case … 
where the class of duty owers is …restricted” rather than comprised of 
everyone generally.160  Assumptions about such a nexus are more 
problematic in the context of special duties, like the duty of non-use or 
disclosure in the context of idea-submission law, simply because the law 
must sort through and select from its subjects to find the appropriate duty-
ower. 
The circumstances in which Anglo-American law takes for granted 
that it is appropriate to impose special duties all evince respect for a 
potential duty-ower’s will or agency.  Thus, absent binding everyone on 
the basis of reciprocity,161 the idea of responsibility in our legal system rests 
on a minimum foundation of voluntariness.  Special duties are imposed on 
under a requirement of this kind simply because of who one is and of one’s social 
situation.”) There is also anecdotal evidence of willingness in the Western tradition to 
accept duties that flow from a position into which one was forced (extra-legally, by some act 
of duress, in some cases physical force).  For instance, Rebecca West reports that it was 
customary in medieval Croatia to starve recalcitrant priests into accepting the position of 
bishop, a position fraught with danger and of course onerous obligations.  Once in the 
position, Ms. West reports that the bishops considered themselves morally bound to 
perform their duties.
156 J. E. Penner, The Analysis of Rights, 10 RATIO JURIS 300, 306 (1997).
157 RAZ, ETHICS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 138 at 243 (“To say that a 
person has a right is to say that an interest of his is sufficient ground for holding another to 
be subject to a duty, i.e. a duty to take some action which will serve that interest or a duty 
the very existence of which serves that interest.  One justifies a statement that a person has a 
right by pointing to an interest of his and to reasons why it is to be taken seriously.”)
158 J. E. Penner, The Analysis of Rights, supra note 156 at 300 et seq.
159 Id. at 310.  Note that Penner was comparing special private law duties with 
general legislative duties.
160 Id.
161 For example, imposing reciprocal duties on everyone not to interfere with the 
property and bodily integrity of others.
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three bases.  First, there are duties imposed on some but not everyone on 
the basis that the obligors consensually undertook them.  Contractual 
duties are the paradigm for this sort of special duty.  Still other duties are 
imposed on individuals because of their own misfeasance – the voluntary 
invasion of the vested exclusive rights (a duty to make good on tortious 
interference with another’s property or person).162
Finally, there is a third basis on which Anglo-American law will 
assume a sufficient nexus: where the duty-ower voluntarily accepted 
position, from which certain duties inescapably flow.  In all of these cases, 
the law-maker is not so much selecting an appropriate duty-ower but 
rather responding to self-selection.  A person who voluntarily takes on a 
duty, a person who voluntarily interferes with the vested rights of others 
and a person who voluntarily accepts an avoidable position have all 
identified themselves to the law as appropriate candidates to assume a 
duty. 
The kind of special duties that most concern me here is this third 
category of positional duties.  The basis on which positional duties are 
imposed suggest the kind of nexus between the originator and recipient 
that justifies a duty of non-disclosure.
B. Positional Duties and Duties to Rescue
The law does not fix a person with special duties that flow from a 
position unless at minimum that person voluntarily accepted the position.  
The law adheres to its assumption that there is an insufficient nexus 
between duty-ower and rights-holder absent some voluntariness even in 
the most apparently innocuous of situations.163  Consider, for example the 
inter vivos gift.  Even the recipient of a gift is not vested with rights without 
162 Peter Benson, he Basis for Excluding Liability for Economic Loss in Tort Law in
DAVID G. OWENS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 447 (1995).  ERNEST J. 
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 97 (1995).
163 Thus, even a power to acquire property by the unilateral act of possession 
cannot create any new personal duties in any particular person but rather must correlate to 
a general, already existing duty in rem.  See Peter Benson, The Philosophy of Property in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 752 (Jules Coleman & Scott 
Shapiro, eds. 2002).  Simply put, because no new duty is created by acquisition of property 
through possession. That is because we are under a general duty (a duty in rem) not to 
interfere with property that we do not own.  We are not under several million such duties 
with respect to each piece of property that is not owned by us.  Penner makes this point in 
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW, supra note 13 at 23-26.  He also explains why this 
characterization of property rights and duties is superior to the Hohfeldian one, which 
treats a right in rem “as a myriad of rights in personam.”  Id. at 23.  Assuming that we have a 
well-established property scheme in place, no new duty in rem arises with each piece of 
new thing that is created and then claimed as property.
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having voluntarily accepted the gift164 because ownership entails certain 
duties.  In the case of land, an owner faces tax liability, liability for 
environmental damage on the property,165 and heightened duties of care to 
members of the public.166  Because duties flow from this position, the law 
requires acquiescence.  It is similarly the case with other positions, such as 
that of trustee, judge, lawyer, or executor of an estate.167
My claim that the law requires a minimum foundation of 
voluntariness for the imposition of a duty is bolstered by the reluctance in 
Anglo-American law to impose duties on a particular person in a situation 
over which she had no control or exercised no choice.168  Duties to rescue or 
limits on rights in the face of another’s need arise (in jurisdictions where 
these duties and limits are accepted) even where the duty-ower has not 
volunteered either for the duty or the position that gives rise to it. 
164 See 38A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM § 11 (essentials of a gift are donative intent, 
delivery and acceptance.)
165 For instance, under CERCLA legislation, the federal government singles out 
present and past owners of land or facilities where hazardous substances have been 
released or threaten to be released to cover the entire cost of a clean-up even if the owner 
had nothing to do with producing or storing the waste, and, in fact, did not even own the 
land either at the time of the improper disposal of the waste or at the time of its eventual 
leak.   See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9601-28, ELR Stat, CERCLA § 107.  Private owners are also drafted to meet the 
purposes of the Federal government in the Endangered Species Act.  They are required not 
use their land in a way that harms, harasses or kills species listed as endangered or 
threatened or that modifies or degrades a species’ critical habitat under the Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544, ESA § 9.
166 See 65A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM § 402, 403 (discussing common law rules 
governing occupier’s liability to invitees, licensees and trespassers); 65A CORPUS JURIS 
SECUNDUM § 568 (discussion liability of owner to neighboring landowners.)
167 See 14 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM § 18 (Charitable trust does not vest in trustee 
until trustee accepts position.)  Of course some of the duties that arise in these cases will be 
contractual.  Also, some fiduciary duties arise because of the relations of the parties rather 
than the position the defendant assumes.  See J. E. PENNER on fiduciary relationships in THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS 22 (3d ed. 2002).  The law sometimes makes case by case determinations of 
who is a fiduciary, and imposes duties on this basis, but this really is just the
acknowledgement of a special relationship, in which the duties arise because of the 
voluntary interaction of the parties.  See PENNER, id. at 22-23 (discussing inappropriate 
extensions to the concept of fiduciary.)
168 See TONY HONORÉ, Nécessité Oblige, in MAKING LAW BIND 125-29 (1987) (noting 
reluctance in Anglo-American law but arguing in favor of duties to rescue). See e.g. Union 
Pacific v. Cooper, 72 P. 281 (Kan S.C. 1903) (railway company not liable for failure to assist 
Plaintiff’s son when the injury that resulted in his death was not their fault); Home Office v. 
Dorset Yacht, [1970] A.C. 1004, 1026-28 (no obligation in common law to confer a benefit on 
another or to aide another to avoid foreseeable loss where there is no legally recognized 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant).  And of course scholars like Ernest Weinrib 
find a duty to rescue outside the scope of the common law idea of responsibility because 
there should not be liability for nonfeasance, in the sense of failing to provide a hoped for 
benefit to which the plaintiff had no vested right.  See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, supra note 162 at 97 
(Harvard Univ. Press, 1995).  But note that Ernest Weinrib expressed a different view in 
support of a duty to rescue in and earlier article, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J.
247 (1980).
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There are of course those within the Anglo-American tradition who 
argue that the law should recognize non-voluntary duties that flow from 
non-voluntary positions.  Honoré for instance argues that these duties are 
justifiably imposed because a burden has to be assumed by someone, and 
the duty-holder is the most expediently placed to do so—nécessité oblige.169
There are a few cases in American case law that appear to agree with him 
and which find that necessity gives rise to a duty to offer another 
benefits.170  Most famously, in Depue v. Flatau, the Flataus refused the 
plaintiff’s request to spend the night after dinner.  Although the plaintiff 
was evidently ill and it was a bitterly cold, the Flataus bundled him into his 
cutter and sent him on his way.  He was found nearly frozen to death the 
next morning, having fainted and fallen out of the cutter.  In the suit that 
followed, the Flataus argued that they were under no legal obligation to act 
as Good Samaritans, and could not be liable for refusing to let the plaintiff 
spend the night.  On appeal, the court rejected this argument, finding that, 
in such circumstances, the law imposes a duty to provide the necessary 
relief. 
Generally, however, courts are reluctant to import necessity as 
broadly into the law of obligations as Honoré thinks it ought to be.  Even 
those courts that do accept a limited duty to rescue have restricted it to 
circumstances of undeniable proximity between the potential rescuer and 
the victim such that the former would have to take positive steps to avoid 
rescuing (by for example shoving a refugee out of his house to face certain 
injury; or pushing a ship out of a safe harbor into a stormy sea).171
It is no surprise that the dominant common law position is that 
there is no duty to rescue another.  This category of obligation pushes the 
law to assume a nexus between rights-holder and duty-ower without any 
regard to the duty-ower’s agency.172  As I have argued, it would represent a 
departure from the principles of obligation in Anglo-American law to 
169 Honoré, supra note 168 at 142.  One example that Honoré gives is from early 
Roman Republic, a son automatically inherited his father’s land, and so the burdens and 
obligations that ran with the land, whether he wanted to or not.
170 Depue v. Flatau, 111 N.W. 1 (Minn Sup. Ct. 1907); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 
(Vt. S.C. 1908).
171 See Depue, 111 N.W. 1 (plaintiff was already in the defendant’s house, which 
required defendant to push him out in order to avoid rescuing); Ploof, 71 A. 188 (dock 
owner responsible in damages for unmooring plaintiff’s ship after plaintiff had sought 
refuge from the storm at defendant’s dock—the nearest safe harbor).  See also Vincent v. 
Lake Erie Transportation, 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. S.C. 1910) (defendant allowed on the basis of 
necessity to remain at the plaintiff’s dock, because otherwise defendant would have been 
cast out into a dangerous storm, although liable for damage to the dock).
172 Scholars like Richard Epstein have argued that a duty to rescue introduces a 
slippery slope of social interference with individual liberty.  See Richard Epstein, A Theory of 
Strict Liability, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 151, 197 (1973).
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assume a sufficient nexus between duty-ower and rights-holder in the 
absence of some minimal foundation of voluntariness.  The law, in order to 
recognize rights must identify a significant interest that the right would 
protect.  But, in recognizing rights the law must also identify who should 
be burdened with the correlating duty. 
 In the discussion above, we have seen the conventional bases by 
which the law selects suitable duty-owers.  In all such cases, the law selects 
the prospective duty-ower for reasons that concern him: his own claims, 
his own promise, his own tortious act.  In the context of the duty to rescue, 
there is no possible basis for singling the potential rescuer out that 
concerns her as an agent: a potential Good Samaritan did nothing to bring 
about the situation and, further, did not volunteer to be in closest 
proximity to the person in need.  The law’s reluctance to recognize a duty 
to rescue confirms that the law requires a minimum foundation of 
voluntariness in the acceptance of a position from which duties flow, if not 
in the assumption of the duty itself, before it imposes a duty.
C. Minimum Voluntariness in the Context of Idea-
submission Law
How then does the duty of non-use or disclosure come within the 
limited idea of legal responsibility in Anglo-American law?  A duty of non-
disclosure is related to positional duties—those duties that flow from a 
voluntarily assumed position.  The obligation not to use another’s idea 
comes from the position of recipient of another’s novel, original and 
concrete idea shared in confidence.  An originator cannot, through her 
unilateral intention and action, force another to assume a position that 
leads to the imposition of duties. Although the defendant need not have 
agreed to assume a duty of non-disclosure or use, he must have voluntarily 
assumed the position that makes him liable to the originator’s power: he 
must have agreed to receive the idea or at least have freely accepted it, 
having had the opportunity to refuse to hear it.173  Once the defendant 
submits to the originator’s power, the originator is able to create in him a 
duty not to use or disclose the idea.  
The minimum foundation of voluntariness is established when the 
originator alerts the defendant to the fact that, in agreeing to hear an idea, 
173 Courts have understood the importance of bilaterality but have often confused
this with what is necessary to find a confidential relationship.  See Official Airlines Schedule 
Info. Service, 333 F.2d at 674 (“The problem here is whether one person, by his gratuitous 
and unilateral act, may impose upon another a confidential relationship. That he may not is 
clear.”) Here I argue that even where we are not trying to establish a confidential 
relationship, for there to be liability to another’s power, unilaterality is not enough.  See also 
Thompson, 150 Cal. App. 2d at 476 (“A cannot impose a confidence on B without B’s consent.  
If A discloses the secret to B despite B’s protest that he does not wish to hold in confidence 
and will not so hold if it is disclosed” then B does not come under a duty not to use or 
disclose. 
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he is assuming the position of recipient of an original and novel idea that is 
not yet in the public domain.  Where the defendant knows that he is 
receiving another’s novel, original and confidential idea, and yet does not 
refuse to hear it, he is liable to the originator's power that is exercised when 
the idea is shared.174  Thus, where an originator informs the defendant that 
she has an idea for a new product, and writes “if you would like me to 
submit the same to you please advise,” she has clearly taken the steps 
necessary to ensure that the defendant has had an opportunity to refuse to 
hear the idea.175  So has a plaintiff who writes to the defendant that he has 
developed a substantial improvement of the defendant’s product “but had 
not shown to any one,” and asks, “whether he could interest defendant in 
this safety device.”176  Similarly, where the originator calls the defendant’s 
assistant, who invites him then to send the idea along, and he does so, in 
an envelope marked “confidential,” he has again protected himself.177
Must the originator always have contacted the defendant first before 
sending the idea?  This is a question of fact that can be resolved by 
common sense and industry custom.  If I were to send an email without a 
subject line that, on being opened, sings out my idea to the recipient it 
cannot be said that the recipient voluntarily received my idea.  On the 
other hand, if I send an idea for a story, with a cover letter explaining that 
my novel and confidential idea is inside, this might suffice.178
A careless disclosure that is not shared confidentially or a 
disclosure that does not give the recipient that opportunity to refuse to 
hear the idea is not the exercise of a power to control disclosure.  Of course, 
an “idea man” might be anxious to negotiate with a defendant, and so does 
not want to make it to easy for the defendant to turn him away.  However, 
where the originator presses his idea on the defendant without giving her 
an opportunity to refuse to hear it, he has left himself unprotected.  While 
the burden falls to the originator to make sure that the defendant has the 
opportunity to reject the benefit, in practice, most defendants take 
elaborate steps to ensure that they do not inadvertently accept an idea.  
These include returning scripts unread or routing all unsolicited 
174 See e.g. Whitfield, 751 F.2d at 93.  In this case, the plaintiff first sent a notice to 
the defendant, advising that his script was forthcoming, following which he sent the script.  
Plaintiff argued that it was industry custom to refuse to receive scripts or to return them 
unopened if a studio does not want to accept outside submissions.  The court, framing its 
discussion in the language of contract, agreed, holding that where a defendant, having been 
given notice that a script is forthcoming, then opens and reads it, there is an implied 
promise to pay for its use.  
175 Flemming, 107 N.J. Super. at 313 (court ultimately rejected claim because idea 
was not novel).
176 Hoeltke, 80 F.2d at 915.
177 Duffy, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 805.
178 These were the facts in Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502 (S.C. 1975).
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submissions through a department separate from the defendant’s own 
research and development team.179
My insistence, in the powers-based approach, on the defendant’s 
opportunity to refuse to assume the position of recipient of an idea brings 
to mind our discussion of unjust enrichment and the problems in the 
context of ideas in finding an adequate opportunity to reject the benefit.  
Recall that the concern there was that, after receipt of the idea, in many 
cases one cannot help but use the idea (and so one has not freely accepted 
the benefit).180  But I also argued that, before receipt of the idea, you have 
not had an opportunity to reject the benefit with a full understanding of its 
potential value because the nature and quality of the idea—critical to your 
understanding of what it is you are receiving—are unknowable before the 
idea is disclosed.  From this, I concluded the law of unjust enrichment was 
in tension with idea-submission law.  Why does it now make sense to 
suggest that we can find a person has freely assumed the position of 
recipient where in another context I argue that there are difficulties in 
establishing free acceptance of the benefit of an idea?  
The illusion of contradiction disappears once we realize that there 
are different questions posed in these two different contexts.  In the context 
of an unjust enrichment account, free acceptance turns on the acceptance of 
a benefit: the law of unjust enrichment concerns whether or not the 
defendant has been enriched or received a benefit, having been given an 
opportunity to refuse the benefit. To determine whether a defendant has 
had the chance to accept the benefit freely, we naturally require that she 
have the chance to assess the nature and potential value of the benefit on 
offer.  Where free acceptance is possible only on an assessment of the 
nature and quality of the idea, Arrow’s paradox is engaged. 
By contrast, in the context of a powers-based approach, our analysis 
does not turn on the defendant’s enrichment or receipt of a benefit.  
Naturally I do not deny that ideas might be valuable.  Someone who is 
liable as a recipient to the originator’s power to control disclosure of an 
idea may contract around the duty not to use or disclose (and so in a sense 
pay for) the idea.  Rather, I emphasize that, on a powers-based approach, 
the salient concern is not whether a benefit has been conferred but rather 
whether an idea–beneficial or not—has been shared and received.  A full 
understanding of the potential value of the idea does not bear on the 
assumption of the position of recipient of an idea as it does on the decision 
to receive a benefit. Thus, it is entirely consistent to say, (1) in the context of 
unjust enrichment, that you have not had an opportunity to reject the 
benefit from an idea before you are able to assess its nature and potential 
value; and (2) in the context of a powers-based approach, that the 
179 See e.g. Vantage Point, I529 F. Supp. 1204 (unsolicited game idea routed to the 
defendant’s secretary and then rerouted to customer service for return to plaintiff, in 
circumstances which made clear that the defendant did not see the idea).
180 See supra notes 92 et seq. and accompanying text.
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requirement of voluntariness is met by an opportunity to refuse to receive 
an idea.
D. Voluntary Acceptance and the Problem of Volitional 
Control
A question that might occur to some is whether the requirement of 
assent by the recipient of the idea belies my characterization of the source 
of the duty as a legal power.  As I mentioned above, there is some 
disagreement about what distinguishes legal powers from mere events to 
which the law responds.  However, there is consensus that a necessary if 
not sufficient condition for the existence of a legal power is that the acts 
that constitute its exercise are within the volitional control of the power-
holder.181  It might be argued against a powers-based approach that the 
actions that constitute the exercise of the power are not wholly within the 
volitional control of the power-holder because the recipient must have 
voluntarily received the idea before she is said to come under a duty not to 
use or disclose the idea.
 While it is true that the voluntary acceptance of the idea by the 
recipient is not within the volitional control of the power-holder, the 
recipient’s acceptance need not be treated as an event that directly gives 
rise to the legal result but rather as a limit on the scope of the originator’s 
power: only those who are in the position of voluntary recipient have a 
liability correlating to the originator’s power.  The acts that constitute the 
exercise of the legal power–sharing a novel and original idea confidence–
remain within the volitional control of the originator. 
This characterization of the place of the recipient’s assent within 
idea-submission law finds corroboration in the way in which powers 
generally work.  While the acts that are the exercise of these powers must 
be within the volitional control of the power-holder, the opportunity to 
perform these acts and to exercise the power need not be.182  Thus, the 
opportunity to exercise a power to acquire property requires there to be 
181 Volitional control over the facts that constitute the action was the defining 
characteristic of a power offered by Hohfeld.  Although it is now recognized that this 
element is insufficient to distinguish the exercise of a legal power from other actions of 
which the law takes notice, volitional control continues to be a necessary if insufficient 
element. 
182 I think that Halpin overstated the matter when he wrote: “Every legal power 
affords the opportunity to exercise the power and to affect the legal position of another 
subject.”  Halpin, supra note 124 at 140. He would have been better off simply to recognize 
that, while the actions that constitute the expression of the decision to bring about legal 
change must be within the volitional control, a particular opportunity to exercise the power 
might depend on circumstances outside one’s control.  And one in fact may be vested with a 
power that one never has an opportunity to exercise.
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unowned property or property for sale.  However, the power-holder has 
no control over whether someone else abandons the thing or puts it on the 
market.  An opportunity to exercise the power to consent to sexual 
relations does not exist unless there is someone else prepared to have 
sexual relations.  A judge has no opportunity to exercise her power to 
sentence absent criminal activity by another, nor a member of parliament 
the opportunity exercise her power to vote on a bill, absent one put before 
her.  In each of these cases, we recognize the existence of the power even 
though the power-holder may not have the opportunity to exercise it and 
certainly cannot control the production of the opportunity.
Similarly, the power to control the extent of the sharing of an idea 
requires something beyond itself for its exercise: the voluntary assumption 
of the position of recipient by another.183
V. Accommodation of Core Criteria in a Powers-Based Account
A unified powers-based account of idea-submission law has an 
advantage over the existing, pluralist approach to idea-submission law in 
that it is consistent with the core requirements that an idea be novel, 
original, concrete and confidential. 
Novelty
On my account, the role of novelty is to distinguish a privately 
controlled idea from a publicly available one and so to limit the scope of an 
originator’s power.  If an idea is novel, it is one that is not known to the 
public, and is thus naturally within the originator’s private control at least 
before she shares it with anyone else.184  Idea-submission law, in conferring 
a limited power to control disclosure of novel ideas, ensures that an 
originator of an idea is not put to choosing between the natural control 
over ideas that she has simply in virtue of being the only person to know of 
it (in stage one) and her interest in engaging in a limited way with others 
with respect to her idea.185  The power is conferred on the basis that it is 
valuable to expand our freedom by enabling us to engage others without 
entirely foregoing the control over our own thoughts we might otherwise 
have by keeping ideas to ourselves.186  Where the person does not start out 
183 Desny, 46 Cal.2d at 715 (in the context of a contract theory, the court noted that 
the recipient must have consented by words or deeds to the disclosure.)
184 See notes 48-51, supra and accompanying text (definition of novelty).
185 Interests are related to our appreciation of values.  Otherwise put, values are 
translated into interests and are localized to individuals.  See PENNER, supra note 13 at 10 
(explaining Raz’s account of the elements of a normative system).
186 See note 142, supra and accompanying text.
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with any natural control over the idea,187 because the idea is not novel and 
thus is not known only to her, nothing is preserved by enabling her to bind 
another to non-use or disclosure when she relays it (although of course a 
legal advantage would be gained).  A power to control non-novel ideas 
would thus not be justified on the basis that it is valuable to enable people 
to share ideas selectively.  It is thus consistent with the justificatory core of 
idea-submission law that it does not protect non-novel ideas.
Originality
A powers-based account of idea-submission law is also consistent 
with an originality requirement.  The role of this criterion is to limit who 
qualifies as a power-holder with respect to particular ideas.  Someone with 
knowledge of and thus the ability to communicate an idea does not have a 
legal power to restrict use or disclosure by another unless she can show that 
the idea originates from her.188  Thus, a recipient with whom the originator 
shares the idea in confidence cannot turn around and create a duty of non-
use or disclosure in third parties with respect to another’s novel idea.  Of 
course a recipient of an idea can bring about a legal change–the 
termination of the originator’s power–through her actions (by using or 
broadcasting the idea to the world).  But in such cases, the law simply 
treats the recipient’s conduct as an event in the world that has legal 
significance.  The law does not treat the recipient as the holder of a legally 
conferred power with respect to the originator’s idea.189  This is because the 
reasons motivating the law’s response do not have to do with the value of 
187 That is, control that exists without the law’s help.
188 In future studies of moral and social questions concerning the proper scope of 
idea-submission law, it might be argued that there is no moral basis for distinguishing 
between ideas that originate with a person and ideas that are not original in this sense but 
which nonetheless are intimately connected with a person.  For instance, it might be that a 
person discovers a novel idea for a book in a diary of her dead lover.  While this paper does 
not provide a full account of the moral foundations of idea-submission law, it is worth 
noting that a potential gap between the broad justificatory core and the narrower 
articulation of this power in idea-submission law is not troubling.   The reason is simply 
because we should not expect a study of the justificatory basis for conferring a power to 
provide the full contours of the law.  The precise limits on a right or a power cannot be 
deduced from the moral reasons that justify it.  As Joseph Raz put it, “it seems to be a 
common philosophical mistake to think that the core justification of a right or any other 
normative institutions is sufficient for fixing its boundaries.  The boundaries of a right are 
greatly affected by existing local conventions and practices, and by institutional 
considerations.” JOSEPH RAZ, Free Expression and Personal Identification, in ETHICS AND THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 133 (1994).
189 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8 § 16.05 a- b at 16-31- 34.  Nimmer 
acknowledges also that idea-submission law does not treat a defendant as under a duty of 
non-disclosure where the defendant received the idea other than from the 
originator/plaintiff.  However, Nimmer makes sense of this in the context of implied 
contract.
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enabling the recipient to cut short the originator’s power but rather with 
the desirability of limiting the originator’s power to controlling disclosure 
of ideas that are not publicly available.190
Concreteness
Concreteness on my account simply establishes that indeed the 
plaintiff is the originator of the idea in question.  In other words, in 
requiring that the originator show that his idea was “ripe for 
implementation,”191 we maintain the divide between the originator’s ideas 
and the recipient’s own ideas fairly in place.  A concreteness requirement 
ensures that the originator’s power is not so broad in scope as to conflict 
with a recipient’s interest in using and disclosing her own ideas. 
Confidentiality
Confidentiality serves two purposes on my account. The 
requirement of confidentiality ensures that the recipient is not treated in 
law as a public audience (albeit a small one).  Because publication results in 
the termination of the power to bind others, expressing the confidential 
nature of the idea in effect characterizes the kind of disclosure the 
originator is made: a limited, private rather than an unlimited public 
disclosure.  Conveying the fact of confidentiality also objectively 
demonstrates an intention to bind the recipient, which is a necessary 
element of the exercise of a power. 
Finally, conveying the fact that an idea is shared in confidence goes 
some way toward giving the recipient the opportunity to refuse to hear the 
idea.  A defendant has voluntarily assumed the position of recipient where 
she has either requested the submission of an idea, or voluntarily accepts a 
novel and original idea, having had the opportunity to refuse to hear it.192
A defendant who has consented to receive the novel and original idea is a 
person under a Hohfeldian liability—she is “one whose legal relations will 
be altered if the power is exercised.”193
190 As discussed in Section III(B)(2), the exercise of a power is distinguished from 
an event that triggers legal change by operation of law by the kind of reasons that motivate 
the conferral of the power: the desirability of enabling the power holder in that way rather 
than the desirability of the particular outcome.
191 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
192 The gist of this requirement is expressed in Faris, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 313. The 
court noted that the defendant in that case could not be held liable to the plaintiff because 
“one could not infer from anything that Enberg did or said that he was given the chance to 
reject disclosure in advance or that he voluntarily received the disclosure with an 
understanding that it was not to be given to others.” Id. at 324.
193 Cook, supra note 123 at 8 (a liability is the correlative of a power and the 
opposite of an immunity.)
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Conclusion
Courts and commentators have been quick to recognize that 
originators of ideas have a strong interest in protection from those who 
would use or disclose those ideas without their permission.  They have 
been much less successful in explaining the jurisprudential basis for this 
obligation.  I have argued that none of the conventional theories for the 
protection of ideas in state law comprehensively explain the circumstances 
under which a recipient of an idea will be held liable for use or disclosure.  
Further, of these standard theories, at least two—a proprietary account and 
an account based on unjust enrichment—are wholly or significantly 
flawed.
I offer a unified account of an obligation not to use or disclose 
another’s idea that is consistent with the existing nature of idea-submission 
law and the law of obligations more generally.  I suggest that the source of 
this duty is the originator’s legal power with respect to her own novel 
ideas.  The law confers this legal power on the basis of our interest in being 
able to share original and novel ideas selectively with others.
This paper suggests that idea-submission law is indeed a 
cognizable category in the law rather than a loosely related set of responses 
to the relationship between an originator of an idea and the recipient.  As 
such it encourages further study of the moral and other reasons that 
motivate this branch of the law.  More generally, this paper contributes to 
our understanding of how the law treats confidences and the relationship 
people have to their ideas, a topic that has been considered mainly in other 
legal contexts such as patent law, the law of trade secrets and the law of 
confidential relationships.
